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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
We  “the  People”  
 Nordic right wing populist parties have a relatively large voter base and claim 
international  legitimacy  by  the  very  fact  that  they  are  not  products  of  a  “revisionist  
agenda.”1 Unlike similar parties in Austria or Germany with their roots in fascism or 
naziism, Nordic right wing populist parties steer clear of these infamous labels from 
Europe’s  past.  However,  the  mass  murder  committed  by  a  Norwegian  Progressive  Party  
member in the summer of 2011 exemplifies the unavoidable danger of right-wing 
populist rhetoric, no matter its historic roots. While traditional European populists stood 
against  the  elite  as  a  way  of  gaining  the  political  support  of  ‘the  people,’    twenty-first 
century right-wing  populism  defines  ‘the  people’  along  ethnic,  national  and  religious  
lines  to  ‘otherize’    immigrants  as  threats  to  their  country’s  specific  culture.2 It does not 
shun its anti-elitist background, but casts the elite as the perceived profiteers of 
globalization  who  benefit  financially  from  the  presence  of  the  ‘other.’34 Unfortunately, in 
the wake of heightened immigration from  Arab  countries,  the  ‘other’  is  increasingly  
portrayed by European right-wing populists as Muslim immigrants and their descendants. 
                                                 
1 Anton  Pelinka,  “Right-Wing  Populism:  Concept  and  Typology”  In  Right-Wing Populism in 
Europe:Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 14. 
 
2 Pelinka, 7. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Ruth  Wodak,  “‘Anything  Goes!’- The Haiderization of  Europe.”  In  Right-Wing Populism in 
Europe:Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 26. 
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In other words, right-wing populists offer themselves as defenders of European 
democracy against the encroaching globalization of Islamism.5 
 The  chronic  ‘othering’  of  immigrants  is  the  modern  ticking  bomb  in  European  
politics. However, before tackling the problem, it is crucial to understand its roots. 
Nordic right-wing  populism  began  in  Denmark.  The  Danish  People’s  Party, the DPP, was 
established in 1995, but gained parliamentary influence from 2001 to 2011 under the 
coalition  government  of  the  Liberal  and  Conservative  People’s  Parties  which  relied  on  
the DPP to gain the requisite support for premiership.  The rapid rise of the DPP has 
reflected a growing trend of Islamophobia among the Danish electorate and more 
importantly, it began the perilous trend of right wing populist parties in Nordic 
countries.6 Therefore, this paper will attempt to chronicle the influence of the DPP in 
Denmark to exemplify the power of the Islamophobic rhetoric of right wing populism on 
public policy. 
 The growth of anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark is particularly startling 
when one considers the international attention Denmark receives for representing the 
pinnacle  of  good  governance.  Forbes  Magazine  has  ranked  it  first  in  its  list  of  “world’s  
most responsible governments.7”  The  Economist  placed  Denmark  at  number  five  on  its  
                                                 
5 Pelinka,12. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Kenneth  Rapoza,  “The  Worlds  10  Most  Responsible  Governments,”  Forbes, November 29, 2012, 
accessed November 2, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/11/29/the-worlds-10-most-
responsible-governments/. 
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list  of  “where  to  be  born  in  2013.8”  Furthermore,  it  recently  regained its position as the 
“world’s  happiest  country.”9 With one of the oldest democracies in the world, Denmark 
has long been a beacon of liberal democratic ideals and a model for the welfare state.10 
Considering  Denmark’s  global  recognition  for  good  governance, the integration of 
Muslims into Danish society represents the integration of immigrants into the small, 
welfare state in the wake of globalization. Furthermore, the rise of the DPP exemplifies a 
larger European effort to portray the immigration of Muslims to Europe as a collision of 
Islamism and democracy in what could also be understood as a form of neo-racism, or in 
the context of this paper, Islamophobia.  
 I will focus on three sectors of Danish society: the media, social services and the 
refugee and asylum system to exemplify the effects of the Islamophobic rhetoric of the 
DPP on Danish public policy. The rise in power of right wing populism in Denmark has 
direct and profound implications on the ability to effectively integrate Muslim 
immigrants into Danish society. In other words, in Denmark, extreme rhetoric is not 
confined to the fringes of the political spectrum, but rather reflected in governmental 
action. I will uncover the specific policies that have been formed from right wing populist 
rhetoric to specifically target Muslims living in Denmark to conclude that the Danish 
                                                 
8 Laza,  Kekic,  “The  lottery  of  life:  Where  to  be  born  in  2013.”  The Economist, November 21, 2012, 
accessed November 2, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life.  
 
9 John  F.  Helliwell  and  Shun  Wang,  “World  Happiness:  Trends,  Explanations  and  Distribution”  in  World 
Happiness Report 2013, ed. John Helliwell, et al. (New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network, 2013), 8-37.  
 
10 Nichols Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjorn  Bergman,  “Denmark:  Party  Agents  on  Tight  Leashes”  
In Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities: The Nordic Countries Compared, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 51. 
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government is undergoing a threatening change in its values in order to protect an ill-
defined  “Danish  way  of  life.” 
 
Roadmap 
   Firstly, Chapter 2 will look at the Danish media and its close ties to the right 
wing government. This will help explain why there is a long history of the negative 
portrayal of Islam in Danish media. I will pay special attention to the controversial 
Muhammad Cartoon scandal of 2005 and evaluate the responses to the controversy in 
Nyborg Fængsel to exemplify the direct and detrimental effects of Danish media on the 
proliferation of the right-wing populist agenda. I will argue that the crisis was 
exacerbated by a poor governmental response from the Prime Minister, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, whose Liberal Party had close political ties to the DPP. In many ways the 
2005 crisis was a direct result of policy reflecting right wing populist rhetoric. Both the 
current infatuation with Muslims in fiction and the Muslim-as-a-victim paradigm in the 
news hint that media discrimination against Muslims is changing, but not necessarily for 
the better.  
 Chapter  3  will  then  evaluate  Muslim  immigrants’  relation  to  social  services  and  
their effects on the stability of the welfare state. The welfare state has an interesting 
influence on integration because of its involvement in the private sphere. I will discuss 
how the DPP has morphed its platform from anti-welfare state to anti-immigration and 
how this shift has affected these specific social services: refugee benefits, transnational 
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marriage, and education. These three areas of the welfare state have undergone policy 
changes to the specific detriment of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. I will 
conclude this section with a discussion of the welfare state in the wake of globalization to 
argue that the proper integration of immigrants could strengthen the system in the long 
run. A prevailing right wing populist rhetoric that actively suppresses Danish Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants will cause the more successful immigrants to emigrate 
before they have the opportunity to give back to the welfare system that had supported 
them.  
 Chapter 4 will follow the transformation of the Danish refugee and asylum system 
from one of  the  most  liberal  systems  in  the  world  to  one  of  the  world’s  strictest.  This  
dramatic  transformation  began  with  a  new  “Alien  Package”  introduced  by  the  Liberal-
Conservative coalition with adamant DPP support. The Package has greatly effected the 
access to asylum, permanent residence and eventual citizenship of refugees. Meanwhile, 
the stifling living situations of refugees in legal limbo, in the confines of refugee camps, 
and regulations that seem to specifically target Muslim refugees has continued to 
undermine  any  chances  of  Muslim  refugee’s  future  integration  into  Danish  society.  The  
direction of the Danish refugee and asylum system has been internationally criticized as 
in-compliant with international and European human rights conventions. As a result, 
Denmark’s  unwelcome  stance  towards  refugees  could  have  the  dual  effect  of  ostracizing  
Muslim refugees from Danish society and of ostracizing the Danish state from 
international legislature. 
 9 
 
 Finally, I will conclude by discussing the current and future state of Denmark. 
After summarizing the findings from the previous chapters, I will give a brief explanation 
of why right wing populism remains so alluring to the Danish electorate. Then I will 
question the current left wing government that took power in 2011. I will also question 
the lack of academic research regarding immigrants and Muslims in Denmark since the 
shock  of  the  2005  “Cartoon  Crisis”  has  subsided.  I  predict  that  the  current  government’s  
unpopularity will lead to a renewed power of the DPP. Furthermore, I suggest that, in 
order for integrationist policies to be effective and for Denmark to remain an active 
member of the international and European community, the DPP redefine its 
understanding  of  “Danishness”  to  include  Muslim  immigrants  and  their  descendants, 
distancing itself from the dangerous power of right wing populist rhetoric. 
 To understand the issues surrounding Muslim integration I will refer to literature 
analyzing these three Danish sectors and question their integrationist impact on Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants. To further my research, I will refer to data taken from 
my project in the summer of 2012 in which I spent two months living within the grounds 
of a Danish Prison, Nyborg Fængsel. In addition to a wide range of literature on my 
specific policy sections, my work includes data from a mass survey sent to employees of 
the kriminalforsorgen, the prison service, and my own observations from my days in 
Nyborg Fængsel which will be referred to as a loose microcosm for Danish society as a 
whole. 
 Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of Danish media, social services and 
refugee and asylum system, I will offer a brief overview of the validity of analyzing a 
 10 
 
prison as a microcosm, Danish culture in general and the complexities of Denmark’s  
coalition government. This background information will help provide context for the 
dangerous rise of right-wing populism as a direct threat to Muslim immigrants in 
Denmark.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT 
 
What makes a Prison relevant? 
 While I have a dual citizenship and have spent a good portion of my life in 
Denmark, my research at Nyborg Fængsel gave me a unique insight into Danish society 
in a small, somewhat controllable setting. My observations and surveys there deserve 
attention. I believe that a prison can serve as an apt microcosm for the society lying 
outside its walls. The father of this theory is Donald Clemmer, author of the influential 
sociological book, The Prison Community.  
  The Prison Community discusses the prison as a microcosm for broader society. 
While  Clemmer’s  thesis  centers  on  an  American  prison,  the  notion  of  a  prison  as  a  
microcosm can hold true for nearly any society that has an established and respected 
judicial  system.  However,  the  “diversification  of  economic  activities”  that  make  an  
American prison representative of American society are prevalent, and arguably more 
pronounced, in Danish prisons.11 The Danish prison system functions on the premise of 
normalization, that is, simulating the outside Danish society.12 Danish prisoners can take 
classes in a range of subjects, work in several different workshops, can cook for 
themselves, have multiple visitations from the outside, they can wear and buy their own 
                                                 
11 Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (San Diego: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1958), 7. 
 
12 Kriminalforgsen,  “A  Programme  of  Principles  for  Prison  and  Probation  Work  in  Denmark,”  Handbook  
from the Ministry of Justice Department of Prisons and Probation,  Nyborg, 2008, 10.  
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clothing, and in some cases, leave prison grounds for important social events.13 While 
this process of normalization may seem exceedingly liberal to a number of readers, the 
point I am making is that it offers a rare, semi-controlled environment to research the 
intricacies of Danish society. 
  Many other scholars have taken this theory into their own academic 
understandings of the prison. Most notably, in Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, Michel Foucault explores the developments in punishment and the establishment 
of  “panoptic”  prisons  as  a  representation  of larger  changes  in  the  “disposition  of  centers  
and  channels  of  power.”14 He  argues  that  scholars  must  view  punishment  as  a  “political  
tactic”  and  implores  that  his  readers  understand  the  societal  implications  of  punishment.  
In his words, he wants us  to  “hear  the  distant  roar  of  the  battle.”15 Other examples include 
Ann Goeting who draws on these understandings of a prison to describe the racism, 
sexism, and ageism prevalent in American prisons as a reflection of greater American 
society.16  Loïc Wacquant argues that more funding should be given to the study of 
prisons  because  it  can  be  “investigated  both as a microcosm endowed with a distinctive 
material and symbolic tropism and as template or vector of broader social forces, 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A for observations of daily prison life.  
 
14 Alan Sheridan trans., Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1977), 
205. 
 
15 Sheridan, 305. 
 
16 Ann  Goeting,  “Racism,  Sexism  and  Ageism  in  the  Prison  Community,”  Federal Probation 10 (1985): 
19, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fedpro49&div=43&g_sent=1&collection= 
journals#188. 
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political nexi, and cultural processes that traverse its walls.”17 With these ideas in mind, I 
contend that looking at a Danish prison can help one better understand complex issues in 
broader Danish society.  
  Naturally, there are limitations in using prison research as evidence about trends 
in Danish society. Firstly, and most importantly, the inmates are in prison because they 
broke the law, and by extension, do not fit into society and its norms. Therefore, their 
ethnic or religious tensions may not speak for all of Danish society. Clemmer concedes 
that  a  criminal  does  not  fit  within  his  rule  bound  society  and  therefore  represents  “the  
sheer individualist.”18 To avoid misunderstanding Danish society, most of this paper is 
dedicated to reviewing supplementary literature, policies and political trends. This 
literary research demonstrates that my research conclusions within the prison mirrors, to 
some extent, beliefs and prejudices outside prison walls.  
   I must also permit the notion that some of my observations and survey responses 
could be distorted. While I tried to blend in as much as possible into the daily life of 
prison culture, my advanced, but not fluent, Danish language skills and relatively short 
two-month stay undoubtedly distinguished me as a visitor. Also, the Institutional Review 
Board  for  ethical  research  prohibits  interviewing  and  surveying  “vulnerable  subjects”  
such as prisoners. Instead I had to change my project so that I observed prisoners and 
surveyed prison guards. My observations mostly stem from visits to an on-site drug 
treatment center where I ate many of my meals and engaged in several meaningful 
                                                 
17 Loïc  Wacquant,  “The  Curious  Eclipse  of  Prison  Ethnography  in  the  Age  of  Mass  Incarceration,”  
Ethnography 3:4 (2001):371, doi:10.1177/1466138102003004012. 
 
18 Clemmer, 6. 
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conversations with the inmates.19 Although, a project that surveyed inmates would have 
been ideal, I think my prison guard survey, which was answered by over 75 prison 
service employees who deal with prisoners on a daily basis, can give insight into the 
habits  of  the  prisoners.  Furthermore,  the  prison  guards’  free  response  answers  
demonstrate  Danish  prejudices  and  beliefs  in  this  “prison-as-a-microcosm”  paradigm.20 
Therefore, despite several drawbacks, my research can still provide insight into the 
growth of Islamophobia in Denmark. 
  In my research I discovered the prisoners of non-Danish ethnicities, especially 
those who identified as Muslims, were largely ostracized from the rest of the prison 
“society”  reflecting  a  trend  in  Denmark:  A  prevailing  right  wing  populist  rhetoric  that  
actively suppresses Danish Muslim immigrants and their descendants. However, before 
beginning I would like to quote Clemmer in stating that my research is “in  no  sense...an  
attack on prisons, the people in them, or the ones who manage them. The prison world is 
interpreted as a natural outgrowth of social trends...21”  In  other  words,  I  am  not  writing  
this to critique the prison system, but rather to learn about ethnic tensions in Danish 
society and to try to connect my findings to a larger European political climate, the rise of 
right-wing populism.  
 
 
                                                 
19 See Appendix A for observations of daily prison life. 
 
20 See Appendix B for further detail on Prison survey responses. 
 
21 Clemmer, xvi. 
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A numbers game  
 It is important to discuss why Muslim immigrants bear the brunt of xenophobic 
criticism. In addition to the rise of right-wing populism, there are two factors that need to 
be addressed: the perceived threat of a large number of immigrants and, even more 
importantly, the pronounced cultural divergences.  
 Like many, small welfare states, Denmark’s  first  wave  of  mass  immigration  lasted  
from the 1960s to the early 1970s. Turkey, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Morocco were 
among the first countries to experience an exodus of citizens to Denmark. There were 
simply not enough Danes to maintain economic growth, and these immigrants were 
expected  to  fill  the  labor  gap.  They  were  deemed  “guest  workers,”  but  most  stayed  and  
eventually became citizens. While there are no specific numbers on the guest worker 
population of this era, it is estimated that these four nationalities constituted around 
15,000 citizens.22 The largest demographic of guest workers were Turkish and today their 
descendants constitute nearly 55,000, or 12 %, of all foreigners in Denmark.23 Next to 
Turkish, which is by far the largest demographic, the top five immigrant nationalities in 
Denmark are Iraqi, German, Lebanese, Bosnian and Pakistanis24.  
 While Denmark does not record demographics of religion, I will assume that most 
of all the immigrants from Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, Palestine and 
                                                 
22 Ulf  Hedetoft,  “Denmark:  Integrating  Immigrants  into  a  Homogenous  Welfare  State,”  Migration Policy 
Institute, November 1, 2006, accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/denmark-
integrating-immigrants-homogeneous-welfare-state/. 
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid. 
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Morocco, all countries with a pronounced immigrant population in Denmark, are Muslim. 
This comes from the fact that 99.8% of Turkish citizens, 97% of Iraqis, 87% of Syrians, 
99.4% of Iranians, 97 % of Pakistanis, 99% of Somalis and 99% of Moroccans are 
Muslim25. In addition to the large population of Turks, Iraqis and Pakistanis, Danish-
Muslim understanding has been exacerbated by a string of Middle Eastern and African 
crises that have led to mass immigrations. However, as my research will present, these 
groups of immigrants received generally unwelcome greetings from Danish society.  
 After the atrocities of WWII, Denmark was internationally acclaimed for its fierce 
protection of its Jewish citizens. The majority of the small population of Jews was able to 
escape to Sweden under Danish tutelage. Historian Dr. Judith S. Goldstein began her 
prestigious  NGO,  Humanity  in  Action,  based  on  these  “courageous”  actions26. The 
United States Holocaust Museum recognizes Danish bravery during this horrific era.27 In 
addition to trying to save the Jews, Denmark had an infamous underground resistance 
movement which fought against the Nazi regime, the only oppressors to ever occupy 
Denmark in Danish history. However, after the War, the Danish government denied entry 
to Jewish immigrants during their diaspora.28 This might be due to the fact that the 
                                                 
25 The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
Note that the demographic for Palestinian Muslims is undocumented, but, for the purpose of this paper, 
Palestinian immigrants will be understood as generally Muslim. 
 
26 Humanity  in  Action,  “Our  History,”  accessed  November  25,  2013,  
http://www.humanityinaction.org/about/10-history. 
 
27 Holocaust  Encyclopedia,  “Rescue  in  Denmark,”  United States Holocaust Museum, accessed November 
25, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007740. 
 
28 Vilhjálmur  Örn  Vilhjálmsson  and  Bent  Blüdnikow,  “Rescue,  Expulsion,  and  Collaboration:  
Denmark's  Difficulties  with  its  World  War  II  Past,”  Jewish Political Studies Review 18 (2006): 3-4, 
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-vilhjalmsson-f06.htm. 
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number of stateless Jews was simply considered too large in 1945. Danes will defend 
their way of life above anything else and may feel jeopardized if another cultural 
demographic seems overpowering. In their eyes, this is logical considering there are only 
5.5 million Danish speakers in the world.29 Right wing populism has latched on to this 
fear of other large cultural groups. 
 
Defining  the  “Danish  way  of  life” 
 Denmark has ruled over several countries including Germany, Sweden and 
Norway. Among Danes, the multinational history of their country is quickly forgotten, 
while its long era of international power is not. After several battles with Germany, 
Denmark’s  most  historically persistent enemy, Denmark was reduced to the small size 
seen today by the middle of the 19th century. By 1864, largely in response to the growing 
power  in  Germany,  Denmark  made  its  national  slogan,  “outward  losses  must  be  made  up  
for by inward gains.”30 Denmark  then  experienced  its  first  “kulturkamp,”  or  culture  war,  
in which the government focused on nationalism, the economic growth of the Danish 
peasant population and the maintenance of the Danish language.31 The term 
“kulturkamp”  exists  in  Danish politics to this day and even became a policy initiative 
during the premiership of Fogh Rasmussen and his Liberal-Conservative coalition. 
                                                 
29 The World Factbook 2013-14. 
 
30  Uffe  OsterGard,  “Denmark:  A  Big  Small  State  The  Peasant  Roots  of  Danish  Modernity”  in  National 
Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience, ed. John L. Campbell, et al. (Quebec: 
McGill-Queen's Press, 2006), 71. 
 
31 Ibid.  
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 Since Denmark seceded land to Germany, its citizens have bragged about being 
from  “a  little  land;;”  A  land  that  that has held its name for centuries and whose flag, 
according  to  legend,  “fell  from  the  heavens”  in  the  year  1219.32 This pride stems from a 
deeply engrained Danish culture which was largely influenced by Nikolaj Frederik 
Grundtvig,  also  known  as  the  “philosopher of Danishness.”33 The Grundtvig movement 
of  the  19th  century  served  to  reestablish  a  “Danish  way  of  life”  through  Danish  
translations of traditionally Nordic texts and powerful sermons.34 Grundtvig’s  speeches  
permanently changed the schooling and church systems in Denmark, but more 
importantly, they defined  a  “Danish  way  of  life.35” An excerpt from his poem 
“Folkeligheden,”  who’s  title  has  no  direct  English  translation,  but  means  something  
similar  to  “the  people’s  way  of  life,”  explains  permeating  Danish  nationalism: 
 People! what is a people?  
 what does popular mean? 
 Is it the nose or the mouth  
 where one discovers it? 
 Is it hidden from the average eye.... 
 
 ....Call all that is un-Danish evil, 
 Guardians  of  Denmark’s  native  land, 
 And while people have different pursuits, 
 All are like one another, 
 They have blood and ancestry in common, 
 The  mother  tongue  and  lion’s  courage...36 
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This poem emphasizes language, loyalty and a certain sense of indigenousness, all 
characteristics  of  a  Dane’s  connection  to his or her homeland. Since the early 19th 
century, the Danish government has expected its citizens to share this level of 
connectedness  to  a  ‘Danish  way  of  life.’  It  helps  explain  the  “peculiarity  of  Danes”  
throughout history.37 For example, their hesitance towards joining the European Union, 
their determined opposition to Nazi occupation and, of course, its rise of Islamophobic 
right wing populist rhetoric.38 
 
Defending  the  “Danish  way  of  life” 
 Denmark’s  emphasis  on  a  prevailing  monoculture  is  explained  by its general 
policy of integration over multiculturalism.39 Integration will be mentioned throughout 
this paper in regards to Danish policy implementation. Unlike many of its European 
counterparts, such as Sweden or the UK, Denmark has shunned the notion of 
multiculturalism, the idea that wholly different cultures can live together while maintaing 
their own languages, beliefs and traditions. In fact, multicultural policies are often viewed 
as  “udansk,”or  “un-Danish”.40 More than anything else, immigrants are expected to 
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embrace Danish culture rather than prioritize their own. However, this is particularly 
difficult for Muslim immigrants.  
 On the official website of Denmark, it is suggested that immigrants new to 
Denmark learn Danish, follow Danish traditions, and, most contrary to believers in Islam, 
“Don’t  talk  too  much  about  religion.”41 Islam  is  commonly  described  as  “a  way  of  life,”  
something that effects Muslims on a day to day basis. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
the Arabic language is full of common sayings  that  mention  God.  “Inshallah,”  or  God  
willing,  is  reflexively  stated  after  any  plan,  wish  or  even  statement.  “Al-hamdulillah,”  or  
thank God, is also an extremely common saying. These colloquialisms, along with other 
public displays of faith, are clearly unwelcome in Denmark. Lastly, Denmark is a country 
of sarcasm. Meaning Danish humor often involves being laughed at, not with. God is not 
immune to this harsh sense of humor. However, God and Muhammad are not subjects to 
be trifled with among observant Muslims. This divergent understanding of humor is best 
reflected in the 2006 Danish cartoon crisis which will be further expanded upon in the 
“Media”  chapter. 
  Danish and Muslim cultures diverge on many more areas, especially in their 
private lives. Firstly, Islam expects a level of modesty in dress, especially among women. 
However, in Denmark, nudity is common-placed on basic cable T.V. and local beaches. 
Secondly, Muslims are expected to wait until after marriage to have sex while the 
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majority of Danish children are born out of wedlock.42 Islam also forbids alcohol 
consumption, a staple of Danish culture. Denmark has a purchasing age of only 16, but 
no drinking age, meaning children can legally drink at home. Furthermore, Danes over 
the age of 15, consume an average of 14.38 liters of pure alcohol per year.43 These 
cultural differences will be further explored in regards to DPP exaggeration which has 
caused further fissures between Muslim and Danish cultures.  
 It should be noted that some scholars argue that Muslim immigrants are inherently 
opposed  to  the  nature  of  integration.  In  his  essay,  “Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist 
Assimilation,” Mustafa Malik contends that Muslims share an unshakable bond that 
supersedes national identity, Umma. This  “global socioreligious  fraternity”  means  that  
religion will remain a main source of identity in the wake of globalization.44 According to 
Malik, while Muslims may blend culturally into some Danish norms, they will never 
blend structurally.45 Therefore Umma denies the possibility of full integration. However 
Malik also predicts that in the wake of a growing multicultural agenda, umma will only 
further  “pluralize  the  west.”46 However,  Malik’s  prediction  does  not  account  for  the  
influential power of right wing populism.  
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Big power for small parties 
 American anthropologist and immigrant to Denmark, Jonathan Schwartz, has 
said,  “In  America  there’s  one  politics  and  fifteen  ways  to  celebrate  Christmas.  In  
Denmark there are fifteen political parties and one way to celebrate Christmas.”47 In other 
words, Danish politics are confusing, but the importance of its monoculture is 
straightforward. Right wing populism is able to utilize this confusing Danish political 
system to propagate Islamophobic rhetoric under the banner of protecting the coveted 
Danish culture. 
 Before chronicling the rise of Danish right wing populism, it is important to 
understand the landscape of Danish politics. The sheer number of political parties and 
confusing  nature  of  their  names,  for  example,  the  “Liberal”  party  is  to  the  right  on  the  
political spectrum, which can make studying Danish politics from an American 
perspective more difficult. Furthermore, it is important to understand the coalition 
government system that characterizes much of Europe which is prime breeding ground 
for small nationalistic parties. These parties can align themselves with larger parties to 
gain governmental power.  Denmark, like all Nordic countries, employs a system of 
negative parliamentarism in which a government need only be tolerated by the majority 
of Parliament, not supported.48 Therefore, Denmark has a history of small parties quickly 
gaining support and power. For example, in 1973 the party representation doubled in 
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Parliament from five to ten parties.49 Seven of these parties were right of the center 
demonstrating the explosive power of small right wing parties.50 However these small 
parties typically experience a very short life-span. The longevity of the DPP represents 
the acute power of right wing populism.  
 Denmark has a long history of traditional populism, that is, the belief in the rights 
of  the  common  people,  or  in  Denmark’s  case,  “the  folke.”51 While every Danish political 
party,  like  most  Western  parties  throughout  the  world,  claims  to  be  speaking  for  “the  
people,”  the DPP makes this claim blatant in its name. Danish sociologist, Jens Rydgren, 
has offered numerous explanations to explain the rise of right-wing populism in both 
Denmark and more generally throughout the world.52 The following points come from 
Rydgren’s  essay,  “Explaining  the  Emergence  of  Radical  Right-Wing Populist Parties: 
The  Case  Denmark,”  which  are  the  most  pertinent  explanations  I  have  found  regarding  
the rise of right wing populism, followed by my own analysis:  
1.  “The  emergence  of  niches  on  the  electoral  arena”:  In this case the niche is the fear of 
large groups of Muslim foreigners. 
2.  “Dealignment  and  realignment  processes”:  The realignment of the Progress Party, 
which will be discussed briefly, helped make room for the DPP. 
3.  “Politicization  of  new  issues”:  In Denmark, the politicized issue is Muslim immigrants 
and  it  receives  ample  media  coverage  as  the  “Media”  chapter  will  demonstrate.   
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4.  “The  degree  of  convergence  in  the  political  space”:  A feeling among the Danish public 
that politics were converging on economic and welfare policies helped make the shift 
towards  “value  politics”  which  are  further  propagated  by  right-wing populism. 
5.  “The  relative  openness  or  closure  of  the  institutionalized  political  systems”: Denmark 
has one of the most open political systems in the world allowing for the growth of several 
small parties. 
6.  “Situations  in  which  the  established  parties  chose  to  collaborate  with  emerging  RRP  
parties  [Right  wing  populist  parties]  and  lend  legitimacy  to  these  parties”:  In hopes of 
support, Premiership or media coverage many Danish political parties have made a 
coalition  with  the  Danish  People’s  party. 
7.  “Must  present  political  programs  – and, even more important, use a political rhetoric – 
that  fit  the  available  niches”:  DPP members are well known for their rhetoric that has 
both gotten them in trouble with the law and allowed for widespread support under the 
guise of a charismatic leader. 
 
 The first Danish populist party, The Progress Party, stood on the platform of tax 
reform.53 However, as immigration increased to the point where it has become a 
perceived  threat,  the  Danish  People’s  Party  broke  away  from  the  Progress  Party  in  
1995.54 After their landslide victory in the 2001 election in support of the winning 
Liberal-Conservative coalition, the DPP stood as the sole powerful populist party in 
Denmark.55 Like most small, populist parties, the DPP rose under a single-issue 
platform.56 In this case the issue was immigration and the Danish electorate was easily 
persuaded. The historic 2001 election, which led to a ten year right wing hegemony, has 
                                                 
53 Bjorn  Fryklund,  “Populism-Changes over Time and Space: A Comparative Retrospective Analysis of 
Populist  Parties  in  Nordic  Countries  from  1965  to  2012”  in  Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and 
Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 269. 
 
54 Aylott, 55. 
 
55 Marsdal, Magnua  E..    “Loud  Values,  Muffled  Interests:  Third  Way  Social  Democracy  and  Right-Wing 
Populism.”  In  Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 50. 
 
56 Pelinka, 10. 
 25 
 
been  described  as  the  triumph  of  the  DPP  and  the  “value  politics”  it  supports.57  In other 
words, issues such as immigration, environmental protection and punishment for 
criminals triumphed in  importance  over  issues  included  in  the  “economic  axis”  of  welfare  
state provision, wages or regulation.58 The DPP was able to gain nine seats in parliament, 
12% of the total seats, due to its coalition with the Liberal Party.59 Propelled by the 
September 11th attacks, which had occurred just two months prior, the DPP was now on 
the forefront of Danish politics; a place it remains until today. 
 After the 2001 elections, the power of the DPP continued to rise. In 2005 and 
2007 it held 13.3% and 13.8% of Parliament respectively.60 However, after the financial 
turmoil of the 2008/09 economic and financial crisis, the electorate began to return to its 
“economic  axis.”  The  DPP  therefore  lost  3  seats  and  now  holds  12.3%  of  Parliament.6162 
While this paper will focus on policies during the Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government from 2001 to 2011, their presence still influences the current political climate 
run by the left wing party, the Social Democrats. 
 For a right wing populist party to remain powerful it needs a charismatic leader.63 
In Denmark, voters have the option to vote for a candidate, usually a party leader, or a 
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party. However, Danes have increasingly chosen to vote for a candidate demonstrating 
the shift to a greater candidate orientated over party oriented political process.64 In the 
case of the DPP, this charismatic leader is Pia Kjærsgaard, the patriotic founder of the 
DPP.  Her  party’s  famous  tagline  “dit  land,  dit  valg,”  your  land,  your  choice,  resonates  
with a large portion of the Danish population.65 She is known for saying controversial, 
attention-grabbing statements such as,  “If they [the Swedes] want to turn Stockholm 
Gothenburg or Malmoe into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honor killings and 
gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Oeresund Bridge.66”  Her  
2012 predecessor, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, is also known for similar statements. When 
discussing the future of Denmark, he has stated that by 2050 there should be no Muslim 
women with headscarves in Denmark.67 As the first powerful right wing populist leader 
in  Scandinavia,  Kjærsgaard  has  been  a  “trendsetter”  for  similar  party  leaders  in  the  rest  of  
the Nordic region.68 This paper will now access whether or not this Islamophobic rhetoric 
has seeped past the parliament and into policy implementation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Aylott, 51. 
 
65 Dansk Folkeparti, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk. 
 
66 Pia Kjærsgaard in BBC Monitoring,  “Denmark’s  Immigration  Issue,”  BBC News, February 19, 2014, 
accessed December 20, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4276963.stm.. 
 
67 Chris Kjær Jessen,  “Thulesen-Dahls drøm om Danmark i 2050: »Islam Light«, lavere skat og mere 
kulkraft,” Politiko August 3, 2013, accessed February 20,2014, http://www.b.dk/politiko/thulesen-dahls-
droem-om-danmark-i-2050-islam-light-lavere-skat-og-mere-kulkraft.    
 
68 Pelinka, 14. 
 27 
 
CHAPTER 3: MEDIA 
 
Questioning an egalitarian media 
 With a history of freedom of speech that spans back to the 18th century, Denmark 
prides itself in its egalitarian media.69 However, a brief overview of Danish media will 
exemplify a focused interest on the differences between Muslims and Danes rather than 
an all-encompassing media that treats religions and ethnicities equally. The negative 
portrayal of Islam in Danish media stems from the deeply engrained, politicized nature of 
the topic.  Furthermore, the media is intimately tied to both the existing government and 
varying political parties. This means that the depiction of Islam in the media generally 
follows political trends, including the Islamophobic rhetoric of the DPP. 
 The Danish Broadcasting Corporation, the oldest electronic media corporation in 
Denmark,  is  a  publicly  run  institution  that  includes  DR,  Danmark’s  Radio,  and  the  
popular news channels on basic cable, DR TV 1 and TV2.70 It is financially supported by 
government funding, advertisements and state-issued licensing fees.71 On the other hand, 
print news media is privately owned, but as this section will demonstrate, historically tied 
to a variety of political factions. Surprisingly, the largest segment of the Danish media 
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industry is publishing.72 With this in mind, after a brief discussion of the portrayal of 
Islam in electronic media outlets and its relationship to the government, this chapter will 
focus largely on print news media. I will give special attention to the infamous 
Muhammad cartoon crisis of 2005 which stemmed from a publication of cartoons in 
Jyllands-Posten, one of the most widely read and influential newspaper in Denmark. I 
will then briefly discuss the popularity of politicized fiction which has worked to 
counteract  the  continuing  “othering”  of  Muslim  immigrants  in  the  news.  Lastly,  I  will  
conclude with a discussion of Danish media today and the future of the portrayal of 
Muslims in Denmark.  
 
The source of Islamophobia in media 
 Many scholars have argued that news biases stem from the political environment, 
meaning that a negative portrayal of immigrants may be a temporary phenomenon that 
changes with the political climate. Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Rune Stubager argue 
that the Danish media in particular gives attention to issues that opposition parties want 
politicized.73 Analyzing radio news from 1984-2004, their hypothesis is supported as 
changes in government power alters the type of issues addressed by the media.74 For 
example, from 1993-2001, when there was a left wing government, right wing issues 
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such as the dangers of a wide-reaching welfare state and the infringement of immigrants 
were the most prevalent in radio news.75 Their argument is further emphasized when one 
considers that during the 2001 election, a game-changing election that put the right in 
power after years of left-wing domination, 66% of TV news stories were about 
immigrants.7677 
 On the other hand, Mustafa Hussain argues that Danish media runs on a “negative  
ethno-political consensus”  rather  than  as  a  product  of  oppositional  parties.78  Of 82 
domestic news items about ethnic minorities, religious predicates were only used for two 
religions, 42 times for Muslims, 3 times for Jews.79 Instead of being introduced by just 
their name, names followed a reference to their religious faith, in most cases, a reference 
to  Islam.  This  demonstrates  a  clear  “otherness”  attributed  to  Muslim  immigrants  and  their  
descendants in Danish media. Furthermore, in the time studied in 1997, 24 out of 27 news 
items concerning crime were centered around Muslims80. Even more shockingly is his 
uncovering of tabloids and advertisement using the phrase “Perker,”  which  is  a  
derogatory  term  to  describe  Arabs  similar  to  the  phrase  “nigger.”81 This data 
demonstrates that there may be something beyond the oppositional political climate that 
dictates media coverage in regards to Muslim immigrants.  
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 The very controversial nature of Muslim immigration may lend weight to a more 
permanent  Islamophobia  in  Danish  media.  The  “thrill  effect”  of  Muslims  in  the  media  is  
arguably irreversible with changes in public opinion. Hussain tests John  Zaller’s  Theory,  
that public opinion is affected by the immediate reaction to media rather than further 
evaluation, through a series of interviews. The interviewees recognize discrimination, but 
blame immigrants for their inability to assimilate. Furthermore, when asked about 
immigration, the interviewees only responded by discussing Muslims despite several 
other immigrant groups and despite the fact that Muslim immigrants stem from many 
different cultures82. These responses represent the influence of media on Danish public 
opinion  that  places  Muslims  in  a  clear  “us  versus  them”  paradigm.   
 My prison survey garnered similar responses regarding the powerful influence of 
news media on the Danish public.83 When the guards were asked if the news affected the 
behavior  of  the  inmates  on  a  regular  basis,  70%  responded  “sometimes,”  while  16%  
responded  “often”  and  only  13%  responded  “never.”  These  responses  demonstrate the 
ideological shaping power of the news media. Therefore, if the news media is regularly 
broadcasting supposed cultural clashes between Muslim and Danish citizens, it can be 
assumed that these polarizing sentiments will be absorbed, to some extent, by Danish 
society as a whole.  
 In conclusion, negative portrayals of Muslim-Danish relations may be a 
permanent staple of Danish media rather than a fluid issue dependent on an oppositional 
right. This is best exemplified by the 2005/2006 Cartoon Crisis which occurred during a 
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right-wing government with left-wing opposition. The crisis, which has been deemed the 
worst catastrophe to hit Denmark since WWII, took over Danish media and plagues 
Muslim-Danish relations to this day.  
 
A  “Muhammad Crisis”    
 In 2005 the media got hold of a new and captivating story. Writer and journalist, 
Kåre  Bluitgen  was  unable  to  find  an  illustrator  for  his  children’s  book  on  the  story  of  the  
prophet Muhammad. Once he found an illustrator, he or she wished to remain anonymous 
in fear of backlash from the Muslim community. The Danish media was hooked on the 
story that pitted freedom of speech against Islamic beliefs. Flemming Rose, cultural 
editor of the most popular Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, responded by asking 
Danish  cartoonists  to  submit  cartoons  depicting  the  prophet  Muhammad  “as  they  see  
him.”  Many  cartoonists  ignored  the  request,  but  on  September  30,  2005,  12  Muhammad  
cartoons were published. The Danish Muslim community was outraged at what they saw 
as an example of systemic negative portrayals of Islam in Danish media. On October 30, 
2005 the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, refused to meet with 11 
ambassadors hoping to discuss Islamophobia in Danish media. Members of the Danish 
Muslim community then took their grievances to the international arena and rioting 
ensued throughout the Arab world. By March 2006, the crisis had left a 139 people dead, 
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over 800 injured and over 10,000 unemployed because of embargoes and destroyed 
buildings.84 
 The majority of Danish journalism deems this crisis “Muhammed-krisen,”  the  
“Muhammad  crisis.”  This  emphasizes  an  issue  connected  to  Islam  rather  than  a  
“tegningskrisen,”  a  “cartoon  crisis,”  which  emphasizes  an  issue  with  the  actual  
publishing of the cartoons.85 In Flemming  Rose’s  article,  “Why  I  Published  Those  
Cartoons?,”  he  depicts  himself  as  a  defender  of  freedom  of  speech  in  the  wake  of  a  
destructive stream of political correctness. He begins with examples of self-censorship 
responding to fears of Muslim backlashes. He then argues that by satirizing Islam, the 
cartoons incorporate Muslims into Danish humor, and by extension, Danish culture. 
Lastly,  he  blames  “radical  imams”  for  misinforming  rioters  in  the  Middle  East86. Many 
scholars and most of the Danish media have taken this line of reasoning. Therefore, in the 
eyes of most of the Danish population, the crisis demonstrates the incompatibility of 
Islam with Western liberal ideals and the Danish imams are to blame for setting fire to 
the conflict.  In December of 2005, a Danish imam supposedly went to the Middle East 
with a 43 page folder of cartoons and drawings.87  Offensive cartoons, such as a depiction 
of the prophet Muhammad as a pedophile, were added to stir unrest and initiate a 
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response88.  The  true  effect  of  “imam  delegations”  during  this  time  period  is  highly  
debated and remains a mysterious part of the entire debacle. Some experts have 
concluded that Danish imams did not spread false information, but simply displayed 
drawings that were part of the hate material sent to Muslim organizations in the aftermath 
of the 2005 cartoons.89 Either way, the governments of the Muslim world became 
involved.  
 At first, distaste with the Danish government was merely symbolic. Iran passed a 
law officially changing the name of Danish  pastries  to  “Prophet  Muhammad’s  Roses.”  
Palestinians made black-market  money  in  an  “attempt  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  local  
flag  burning  market.”90 However, in some countries, most likely to distract from their 
own domestic turbulences, governments fueled violent reactions to the Danish cartoons. 
The Syrian government has been blamed for sending out mass anonymous text messages 
of falsities to fuel demonstrations against Denmark.91  Mohammed Yaqoob Qureshi, the 
minister in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, offered mass sums of money for the death of 
Danish cartoonists.92 Meanwhile, in Denmark, Danish Muslims were being blamed for 
the international violence in what Lasse  Lindekilde  deems  the  “negative  boomerang  
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effect”  of  trans-national activity.93 The DPP used this opportunity to further isolate 
Muslims from the Danish community.  
 At  the  height  of  the  crisis,  the  DPP  was  calling  Danish  Muslims  “traitors”  and  
actively campaigning for the removal of the citizenships of 4 Danish imams.94 
Furthermore, many Danes were disappointed by the disapproving response of major 
Western international actors such as the USA and the UK.95 However, this lack of 
international support helped the DPP rise in popularity to a record high 17.8% support 
rate, making it the third largest party in Denmark.96 Hundreds of news articles and more 
than a dozen books were immediately written on the dangers of Islam. Most of these 
writings stemmed from the Giordano Bruno and Free Speech Societies, right-wing 
organizations that share the idea that the Western world in the midst of a culture war.97 
The  media  response  to  the  crisis  just  furthered  exacerbated  the  “otherness”  attributed  to  
Muslims in Danish media.  
 In 2008, Peter Hervik conducted focus group interviews with Danes undergoing 
higher education. Most of them described Muslims as irrational and dangerous people. 
They also blamed Danish imams, Danish Muslims and Islam as a whole for the crisis.98 
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This  common  rationale  fits  with  the  description  of  a  “Muhammad  Crisis;;”  a  crisis  of  
irreconcilable values between Islam and Denmark, or even more broadly, Islam and the 
West.  
 My Prison survey serves as further evidence for the common Danish notion of a 
“Muhammad  Crisis.”  Of  the  Prison  Guard  responses  regarding  changed  behavior  
following the cartoons, all responded by either discussing the increased radicalization 
among Muslims or by blaming the Imams. In other words, if there was an issue following 
the crisis, it was an issue foremost with Islam. The following are a sample of responses 
that place blame  on  Muslim  inmates  for  “othering”  themselves  from  the  greater  ethnically  
Danish prison population:99 
 There was no change [following the cartoons], the clientele was just as 
 negative and standoffish etc. as was the case before the cartoons. 
The religious aspect is very prominent. We see many [inmates] with Muslim 
backgrounds who want to control according to their belief. 
 Hatred towards Christians. 
 Yes, there was a different mood among the Arab detainees. If we had a 
 difficult time communicating with them before then, it did not get any better. 
More of them-and-us behavior. i.e. Muslims and non-Muslims. Prisoners who 
previously  didn’t  care  about  the  religion, suddenly became extremely religious 
and had to go to Friday Prayer and Christians were no longer allowed to use the 
kitchen tools meant for everyone. Every time they were caught doing something 
illegal (or against the  rules…)  they  excused  it  by  them being Muslims and that 
they were being persecuted against. 
 
The young non-assimilated Muslims stick together more and have become 
rougher with the other inmates. They are more intolerant and might for instance 
claim pots and pans in the kitchen in regards to whether or not they can be used to 
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cook pork. They are very much on edge ready to fight and demand respect, which 
one of course must first earn. I assume it is because they feel exposed and 
insecure in their foundation. I have never experienced any racist behaviors from 
Danes towards the Dark Danes. 
 
All of these guard responses place blame on Muslim inmates. The most shocking 
response  referred  to  the  Muslim  immigrants  as  the  “mørke  danskere,”  or  “Dark  Danes.”  
A term I have never heard used before, but serves as an example of the generalization of 
Muslims in Danish society. 
 One of my most interesting research discoveries was that one of the men that were 
blamed for spreading the crisis to the Middle East was a Prison Imam at my research 
center, Nyborg Prison. Some guards also blamed the Imam as the following response 
demonstrates:  
 
Oddly enough it didn’t  seem  as  though  any  of  the inmates changed  behavior, nor 
that anything was happening in secret that the staff were not supposed to know 
about. Most noteworthy was the fact that the Prison Imam (who was hired by the 
prison and therefore a state employee at the time) had the audacity to travel with a 
group to the Middle East and talk about Denmark in a very negative way. 
Therefore he was both directly and indirectly partly responsible for the entire 
Muhammad case blowing out of proportion as it did. 
 
On one of my first days of research I visited the deserted Nyborg Prison mosque. No 
Imam has been rehired since the firing of Mohamad Al-Khaled Samha, the Prison Imam 
who, according to a few discussions with a number of inmates and guards, supposedly 
“riled  up”  Muslim  inmates  and  participated  in  the  public  defamation  of  Denmark  while  
traveling in the Middle East.100 Without a religious leader on the Prison grounds, not a 
single Muslim entered the prayer room during my two month stay. These survey 
                                                 
100 See Appendix A for observations of daily prison life. 
 37 
 
responses and observations demonstrate the Danish propensity to depict the cartoons as a 
“Muhammad  Crisis.”   
 
A  “Cartoon  Crisis” 
 International migration and ethnic relations specialist, Peter Hervick, argues that 
the crisis is an example of Islamophobia within the Danish media that spans decades. 
Hervick, like a small portion of the Danish population and a growing base of scholars, 
argues  that  the  cartoons  were  in  fact  a  “cartoon  crisis”  rather  than  a  “Muhammad  crisis”  
between  two  conflicting  cultures  that  pit  an  “enlightened”  view  of  media  against  a  
“barbaric”  religious  view.    The  “cartoon  crisis”  argument  stems  from  years  of  right-wing 
populist rhetoric against immigrants in Danish media and a history of newspaper-political 
party affiliations.  
 Hervick describes the sensationalist nature of Islam in the news media as a 
consequence  of  “re-politicization”  to  compete  in  a  rapidly  expanding  market.101 For 
example, to compete with free dailies, which at one point held 60% of the print news 
market, larger newspapers used the values and opinions of the extreme right to 
compete.102 In 1997, Ekstra Bladet and B.T., the most popular tabloid papers in Denmark, 
began a string of opinion pieces highly critical of immigration and Islam which Hervick 
connects to the rise of the DPP.103 These pieces were reinforced by the larger and more 
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respected Jyllands-Posten. During Ekstra  Bladet’s  campaign,  “The  Foreigners”,  Jyllands-
Posten published a highly politicized story about a ten-year-old Danish Muslim boy 
named Amin.104 Amin, who was expelled from school for refusing to bathe with his peers 
before swimming, began as a story defending the boy against perceived racism. However, 
after a number of Jyllands-Posten’s  letters to the editor, it quickly transformed to a 
culture war, with Amin being on the wrong side of the battle.105 
 Another  example  Hervick  stresses  is  the  “Mona  Sheikh  story”  of  2001.  Three  
Danish Muslims, Mona Sheikh, Tanwir Ahmed and Babar Baig, ran for political office in 
the Radical Left. However, they were attacked by a number of news sources as supporters 
of terrorist organizations and party officials quickly distanced themselves from the three 
men.106  Jyllands-Posten published more anti-Islamic articles than any other Danish 
newspaper during this time and was the only news source that did not retract their 
statements after the Danish Press Council ruled that the connection to terrorism was 
completely unfounded.107 With these examples in mind, a long-lasting campaign against 
Muslim immigrants in the Danish media seems like a likely explanation  for  the  “Cartoon  
Crisis”  of  2005/06.   
 Furthermore,  a  “Muhammad  Crisis”  insinuates  that  Christians  in  Denmark  differ  
from Muslims because they allow the satirization of their own religion. However, The 
Guardian was contacted by a Danish cartoonist in 2006 to leak a story in which Jyllands-
Posten refused to publish his cartoons with Jesus on the basis that they would be too 
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offensive. Jyllands-Posten responded by stating "in the Muhammad drawings case, we 
asked the illustrators to do it. I did not ask for these [the Jesus] cartoons. That's the 
difference.”108 This demonstrates a clear case of provocation in regards to Danish 
Muslims. Jytte Klausen, a Danish Political professor, describes the intention of Jyllands-
Posten’s  cartoons  most  clearly  by  stating,  “They are the pebble that started a tsunami -- 
but  they  were  never  meant  to  be  innocent.”109 
 Four of the twelve cartoonists who drew the Muhammad cartoons were directly 
employed or previously employed by Jyllands-Posten. Those four cartoons are the most 
controversial of the group.110 For  example,  the  most  infamous  cartoon,  “Muhammad  with  
a  bomb  turban,”  was  drawn  by  Jyllands-Posten employee, Kurt Westergaard. It is 
especially offensive because it contains the Islamic testimony of faith on the bomb which 
insinuates Islam in its entirety is a violent faith.111 The cartoonists who were independent 
from Jyllands-Posten illustrated more ironic and less aggressive cartoons. Most notably, 
one cartoonist depicted Muhammad as a child writing on a blackboard "Jyllands-Posten's 
journalists  are  a  bunch  of  reactionary  provocateurs,”  demonstrating  that  not  every  
participant  condoned  the  “freedom  of  speech”  premise  behind  the  cartoons.112 The 
difference in the cartoons drawn by Jyllands-Posten employees and those less offensive 
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ones drawn by independent artists suggests that Jyllands-Posten, like many other Danish 
media sources, is more incentivized by Islamophobic political discourse than an actual 
battle for freedom of speech. 
 As Jyllands-Posten’s  cartoons  are  put  in  the  context  of the larger history of 
Danish  media’s  sensationalization  of  Islam,  the  crisis  is  more  clearly  unveiled  as  a  
“Cartoon  Crisis.”  “Cartoon  Crisis”  insinuates an issue with Danish media rather than an 
issue between two competing cultures. In fact, the Muslim ambassadors who called for a 
meeting with the Prime Minister had a long list of grievances in addition to the cartoons 
that were perceived as slander against Islam.113 Considering their list of media slander, 
one questions the decision of the government to refuse the meeting with the Muslim 
ambassadors and, more importantly, the connection between the media and the Danish 
government. Instead of meeting with the 11 Muslim ambassadors, on October 30, 2005, 
Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen gave an interview with Jyllands-Posten stating 
“Freedom  of  speech  must  be  used  for  provocation.114”  This  drastic  move  sheds  light  on  a  
criticism that more left-wing papers have attributed to Jyllands-Posten for years: that it, 
like several other media sources, work together with right-wing parties.115 
 Firstly, freedom of speech is the very thing that allows Fogh Rasmussen, who was 
also Minister of the Press, to criticize the cartoons.116 However, instead of distancing the 
government from the newspaper or condemning the views behind the cartoons, he 
brought his government closer to Jyllands-Posten.  Furthermore, the ambassadors were 
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not asking the Prime Minister to remove the cartoons, which would be a legal violation of 
freedom of speech, but rather to discuss the portrayal of Islam in Denmark and discuss 
the steps necessary for inter-faith dialogue117. Their complaints, as stated earlier, were not 
against the cartoons alone. They had a long list of grievances that included a neo-nazi 
radio station and some public remarks from DPP members which  Fogh  Rasmussen’s  
government had previously condemned.118  The refusal to distance themselves from 
Jyllands-Posten demonstrates a deeper connection between certain media outlets and 
political parties.  
 In an internal survey made by Jyllands-Posten in 2004, 81% of employees 
answered  “yes”  to  the  question,  “Do  you  feel  that  Jyllands-Posten has become more right 
wing  in  its  way  of  prioritizing  journalistic  stories?”119 Therefore, it may not come as a 
surprise that Jyllands-Posten supported the premiership of Fogh Rasmussen, the leader of 
the right wing Liberal Party. Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched his political strategy, 
“kulturkamp,”  or  “culture  war,”  which  was  quickly  joined  by  Jyllands-Posten in the 
summer of 2003 with their “culture  war”  strategy  that  would focus on the maintenance of 
Danish culture.120 In 2004, they hired their Moscow correspondent, Flemming Rose, as 
the cultural editor to spearhead this strategy.121 His  call  to  depict  Muhammad  “as  you  see  
him”  is  a  clear  offshoot  of  a  larger  right-wing political strategy.  
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 Jytte  Klausen  suggests  that  the  governmental  response  to  the  “cartoon  crisis”  may  
be  a  direct  result  of  DPP  influence.  The  success  of  Fogh  Andersen’s  Liberal  Party  
depended on the support of the DPP, without which they could not hold on to the 
premiership. Therefore, Pia Kjaergaard may have threatened to withdraw support of the 
DPP if Fogh Rasmussen did not take a stand affirming Jyllands-Posten.122  The DPP uses 
freedom of speech as a central platform and actively campaigns to get the blasphemy law 
taken out of the Danish constitution.  In fact, many DPP members have a personal stake 
in this campaign in order to avoid legal problems with their own speeches. For example, 
in 2006, DPP members, Jesper Langballe and Soren Krarup, described Muslims as "a 
cancer on Danish society" in Parliament which leads to them being threatened with the 
blasphemy law.123 Another explanation is that Fogh Rasmussen genuinely believes that 
Denmark is in the midst of a culture clash and that the media is at the forefront of the 
battle.124 Either way, by responding to the crisis with an interview in Jyllands-Posten, 
Fogh Rasmussen and his government seemed in full support of the cartoons.  
 While the tabloid papers, Ekstra Bladet and B.T, were the strongest supporters of 
both Jyllands-Posten and the government during the cartoon crisis, Fogh Rasmussen set a 
political precedent for many other media outlets.125 On February 17, 2008, following the 
uncovering of a murder plot against one of the cartoonists, seventeen Danish newspapers, 
even those with a political history connected to the left wing, republished the twelve 
cartoons  as  a  statement  of  “freedom  of  expression”  and  in  solidarity  with  Jyllands-
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Posten’s  cartoonist.126 Despite even more media support for the Muhammad cartoons, 
this publishing did not cause an international uproar. 
 Hervick argues that the crisis could have been avoided if the government 
distanced themselves from the Danish media rather than showing solidarity with the 
cartoons. Without being able to engage in dialogue in their own country, it can be argued 
that it is only natural for Muslims to turn to their home-government or to network with 
Muslim organizations for support and consultation.127 Sweden had their own Muslim 
cartoon debacle in 2007, but the government quickly distanced themselves from the 
newspaper and used the experience as an opportunity for inter-faith dialogue.128 
Consequently, the Swedish crisis did not cause international outrage. With this logic, it 
was the link between the Danish government and Jyllands-Posten that led to the mass 
outrage.  
 Since the Danish Cartoon Crisis, the Danish government has learned to respond in 
a  manner  similar  to  the  Swedish  government’s  response.  In  October  2006  the  free  daily,  
Nyhedsavisen, published images from a Danish  People’s  Party’s  youth  organization  
which held a competition to see who could draw the most vulgar prophet Muhammad. 
The government immediately invited Muslim ambassadors to Denmark to apologize for 
and discuss the cartoons which distanced the government from the drawings.129  
Similarly, the 2008 mass republication of the Muhammad cartoons was handled by inter-
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faith and inter-cultural dialogue and without a government presence behind the cartoons. 
Consequently, there was no transnational action from Danish Muslims and a crisis was 
easily avoided.130  
 
Politicized fiction: a small critique of the right 
 As the crisis subsided, so has data about Muslims in Danish media. We know that 
there has been a learning process since the publishing of the 2005 cartoons, but are 
Muslims given a fairer portrayal in the current Danish media? This is a hard question to 
answer without further data collection. However, what can be deduced from current 
analysis is that Muslim integration into Danish society is still a highly politicized and 
popular topic in Danish media through both positive and negative responses to the 
continuing presence of right-wing populist rhetoric. In fact, it has been widely discussed 
by scholars that Denmark is now in an era of politicized fiction.131 From popular novels 
focusing on the lives of Danish politicians, to a large number of controversial Danish 
films,  the  assimilation  of  Muslims  and  the  meaning  of  “Danishness”  is  highly  debated  in  
the arena of fiction. 
 A popular 2007 film, AFR, uses a mocumentary style to satirize the premiership 
of  Anders  Fogh  Rasmussen  and  criticize  the  Danish  People’s  Party.  The  concept  of  
“freedom  of  speech”  is  tested  by  calling  Fogh  Rasmussen  gay  and  by  using  out-of-
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context  quotes  from  the  Danish  People’s  Party’s  leader,  Pia Kjærsgaard, are used to 
emphasize  the  “otherness”  attributed  to  this  stigma.  By  the  film’s  conclusion,  it  is  
insinuated  that  Fogh  Rasmussen  was  murdered  by  members  of  the  Danish  People’s  
Party.132 Similarly, The T.V. show, Borgen, whose title refers to the parliamentary 
building, Christianborg, uses fictionalized Danish politics to discuss and satirize the 
Danish  People’s  Party.  Borgen has a popular following that has surpassed Danish media 
and spread to America. The show follows a female Prime Minister, who after her 
premiership, becomes so upset with the growth of right-wing populist rhetoric in other 
parties, that she begins her own political party.133 These examples are just some of many 
that represent a Danish fascination with politicized fiction. It also demonstrates that after 
the  “cartoon  crisis,”  many  Danish  media  outlets  recognize  the  spread  of  right-wing 
populism as an instigator for Danish discrimination against their Muslim population.   
 However, criticism of right wing populist influence in Danish politics are not seen 
or heard in everyday media outlets. The inability to assimilate Muslims in Danish society 
is still a popular headline that guarantees mass viewership. Many arguments made in 
Mustafa  Hussain’s  aforementioned  2006,  article  still  hold true. Muslims are still 
portrayed  in  an  “us  versus  them”  paradigm.   
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Muslim victims over Danish Muslims 
 The only positive news coverage of Muslim immigrants seems to place Muslim 
women  and  children  as  “victims.”  A  quick  search  through  a  number  of  Danish 
newspapers  shows  heavy  coverage  of  the  “unjustness”  of  Islam  on  weaker  members  of  
society. This is best exemplified by one of the few Muslims to receive positive Danish 
media attention, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali- American activist who fights against Islamic 
practices  that  harm  women.  In  2010,  she  received  the  “Freedom  of  Expression  Award”  
from Jyllands-Posten and  gave  a  widely  covered  speech  at  the  Danish  People’s  Party  
Convention.134135 
  In  the  news,  human  interest  stories  also  play  this  “victim  card”  when  discussing 
Muslims to capture a large audience on established news channels.  In the fall of 2013, 
“Stor  A:  fra  bandekrig  til  jihad,”  translated  to  “Big  A:  from  gang  to  jihad,”  was  a  two  
part, story on the public news channel, DR 2, that followed a former gang member into 
the brutal fighting against the Assad regime in Syria. The news story portrayed the plight 
of  the  Syrians  and  the  “jihad”  rebels  as  hopeless.136 In March 2009, Iraqi asylum seekers 
were arrested and, in some cases, repatriated to their home country after hiding out in a 
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Danish church.137 The media coverage for this event was so intense that it developed into 
a conflict with radical left-wing groups confronting the police in the streets. While 
Muslims  are  widely  viewed  as  “victims”  in  the  Danish  media, they are rarely referred to 
as  “Danish.” 
 One of the only Danish Muslims I was able to find in Danish media was Yahya 
Hassan.  Yahya is known for his widely viewed YouTube videos in which he reads his 
poetry describing life as a Danish Muslim.  His poems are delivered intentionally in 
broken Danish with a heavy Arab accent, satirizing his fellow Danish Muslims. The 
following is an excerpt (because of foul language, a very short excerpt) from his poem, 
“Langdigt,”  or  “Long  Poem” 
Me,  I’m  telling  a  truth, what are you saying about your God with the smell of 
weed  in  your  mouth?  You,  you’re  a  Muslim.  You,  you  don’t  know   whether you 
want Halal or Haram. You, you know that you want Haram,  but  you’re  pretending  
to want  Halal.  You,  you  don’t  want  pork,  may  Allah praise your eating habits. 
You, you want Friday prayer until the next Friday prayer. You, you want 
Ramadan until the next Ramadan. And in between the Friday prayers and the 
Ramadan, you, you want a knife in your pocket. You, you want to bump in to 
people  and  ask  them  if  they’ve  got  a  problem,  even  though  the only problem is 
you.138 
 
It is clear that Yahya takes the view of many right-wing populist Danes and of much of 
the Danish media; that Muslims in Denmark fail at assimilating because of their own 
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wrongdoings. This opinion has gotten him a fair amount of media attention culminating 
with an upcoming weekly column in the newspaper Politiken.139 
 Similarly, Basim, who recently won the Danish representative spot in the 
upcoming 2014 Eurovision singing contest, emphasizes his Danish integration. The first 
Danish Muslim participant has repeatedly stated that he was taught to stand firmly by his 
“Danishness”  and  the  power  of  integration.140 The talented, Arab-Danish singer was 
voted by viewers at the Dansk Melodi Grand Prix after his patriotic performance of 
“Cliche  Love  Song.”  His  performance  was  the  only  one  that  donned  a  large  Danish  flag  
and  a  prideful  “Danmark!”  exclamation  between  breathless  verses.141 His patriotic show 
emphasized his integration and led to the support of his Danish viewers. 
 In Danish media today, it seems that Muslims are either being portrayed as 
victims of their own religion or as either successes or failures at assimilation. Either way, 
they  are  told  that  “the  problem  is  you.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Mads  Zacho  Teglskov,  “Bagsiden  præsenterer  ny  satsning:  Yahyaliv,”  Politken, January 6, 2014, 
accessed February 10, 2014, http://politiken.dk/bagsiden/ECE2174928/bagsiden-praesenterer-ny-satsning-
yahyaliv/. 
 
140 Jan  Eriksen,  “Bag  triumfen  gemmer  sig  sorg  og  stærk  familie- følelse: Basim - en hårdt prøvet 
rollemodel,”  BT, March 3, 2014, accessed March 5, 2014,  http://m.bt.dk/?article=28562779-Bag-triumfen-
gemmer-sig-sorg-og-staerk-familie--foelelse-Basim---en-haardt-proevet-rollemodel. 
 
141 “Basim-Cliche  Love  Song,”  YouTube  video,  3:10,  posted  by  "Melodi  Grand  Prix,"  March 8, 2014, 
accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRHKkYrXSjM. 
 49 
 
The future of Danish media 
 The  2006  cartoon  crisis  became  a  “crisis”  because  of  a  poor  governmental  
response. The media and the Danish political right wing have a history of cooperation in 
regards  to  pressing  “value  politics,”  or  politics  focusing  on  the  issues  of  immigration and 
perceived culture clashes. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, Danish fiction has been 
increasingly politicized and critical of the right wing influence on Danish public opinion. 
However, the victims of Islam and assimilation arguments like that of Yahya Hassan will 
continue to permeate the Danish media. 
 Danish anchors and interviewees are infamous for their unchallenging stance with 
their interview guests142. In other words, politicians with a right-wing populist agenda can 
say almost anything on the news without being challenged; it makes for good television. 
The  Danish  People’s  Party  and  their  ally,  the  Liberal  Alliance  are  still  fighting  for  the  
removal of the blasphemy section of the Danish constitution so they can continue to 
exercise  this  “freedom  of  speech”  in  Danish  media.143 The Blasphemy Act protects all 
religions from defamation, but has not resulted in an actual conviction since 1938.144 The 
fact that the DPP is actively campaigning for its removal demonstrates their intentions to 
drive Denmark towards their right wing populist agenda through the media. The public 
and  political  responses  to  the  misleadingly  titled,  “Muhammad  Crisis,”  and  the  direction  
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of Danish entertainment and news media shows that, in the case of the media, Danish 
policies  are  intentionally  “othering” Muslim immigrants and their descendants.  
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL SERVICES 
 
The welfare state enters the private home 
 Denmark’s  welfare  system  has  long  functioned  as  a  powerful  force  in  everyday  
Danish society. However, the tax funded system penetrates into the depths of the private 
sphere. Given the anti-immigration sentiments of right wing populism, comes a disdain, 
albeit a limited one in the American sense, for this power of the welfare state. To 
continue my focus on the superimposed struggles of Muslim integration in Denmark, I 
will discuss the welfare laws that specifically affect Muslims immigrants and their 
descendants. Since welfare touches many aspects of societal infrastructure, from 
education to housing, it plays a powerful and interesting role in the process of integration. 
Karen Fog Olwig sums up integration in the Scandinavian welfare state by stating that it 
has  become  a  “...term  denoting  the  ability  to  conform  to  social  norms  and  cultural values 
defined  in  dominant  discourse  as  basic  to  proper  citizenship…designating  who  belongs-
and by implication who does not belong-in  society.”145  Since the wide reaching branches 
of the welfare state, as Olwig aptly summarized, have the power to dictate  society’s  
norms, it has a particularly important role in regards to the integration of Muslims in 
Denmark.  
 This is not a complete review of the Danish welfare system, an entirely new 
research topic in itself, but rather an overview of a few issues that directly effect Danish 
immigrants and have are supported by research: The social benefits available to refugees, 
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the welfare objections to trans-national marriages, and changes in educational services. 
Hopefully this review can be used as both a jumping off point into further research and, 
most importantly, paint a more detailed picture of Danish Muslim life in the wake of a 
lasting right wing populist influence. 
 
The DPP: bridging welfare and immigration 
 The DPP rose to prominence through its anti-taxation rhetoric, but gained power 
through its anti-immigration stance.146 In the eyes of many Danes, the two platforms are 
intimately connected. A relatively high unemployment rate in Denmark caused public 
concern over immigration to spike drastically from 4% in 1989 to 25% in 1998.147 The 
DPP was able to capitalize on this fear that immigration was the cause of economic 
disruption. Increased unemployment is a tool that the DPP uses to oust a system that, they 
argue, drains citizens of resources as foreigners monopolize any positive effects of the 
high taxation. Furthermore, studies have proven that there are no positive net transfers to 
the state from immigrants of non-western countries.148 However, this evidence does not 
necessarily support the demise of the welfare state. In the latest documented financial 
quarter, only about 15.6% of Danes receiving public benefits were born outside of 
                                                 
146 Harald  F.  Moore,  “Immigration  in  Denmark  and  Norway:  Protecting  Culture  or  Protecting  Rights?”  
Scandinavian Studies 82:3 (2010), 357, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25769037 . 
 
147 Moore, 358. 
 
148 Eskil  Wadensjö  and  Christer  Gerdes,  “Immigrants  and  the  Public  Sector  in  Denmark  and  Germany”  in  
Migrants, Work, And The Welfare State, ed. Torben Tranaes et al. (Odense: University Press of Southern 
Denmark, 2004), 334. 
 53 
 
Denmark. Meaning, 84.4% of Danes receiving public benefits are, in fact, born in 
Denmark.149 In other words, the welfare state is still widely utilized by ethnic Danes.  
 Using the 2002/2003 European Social Survey, Claudia Senik, Holger Stichnoth 
and Karine Van der Straeten analyze the connection between immigration and the 
opinions on the welfare state of European citizens of their country’s  ethnic  origin.    They  
conclude  that  immigration  does  not  necessarily  reduce  native  citizens’  support  for  the  
welfare  state  unless  they  have  a  “pure  dislike”  of  immigrants  and/or  they  are  concerned  
about the economic consequences of immigration. When both sentiments are felt, as in 
the case of the DPP, they will react much more negatively towards the welfare state.150 
However, being anti-immigration is not a precursory stance to being anti-welfare state. In 
fact,  those  who  felt  neither  a  “pure  dislike”  of immigrants nor concern for the economic 
consequences of immigration were more inclined to be anti-welfare state independently 
of immigrants.151 The fact that the DPP has brought immigration and the welfare state 
together as intrinsically connected issues reflects a greater xenophobic attitude.  
 
The refugee meets the welfare state 
 In the previous chapter I briefly discussed the 1997 Ekstra Bladet article series, 
“The  Foreigners”  as  one  of  many  examples  of  the  media  defamation  of  Muslim  
immigrants and their descendants. The article series explored specific immigrant cases of 
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abuse  of  the  ‘generous’  Danish  welfare  system.  The  series  was  so  widely  read  it  spurred  a  
reality TV show about a Somali man with two wives and eleven children.152 Somalis, one 
of the latest refugee groups to enter Denmark, were already under fire for their stark 
cultural differences and their high crime rate. The series, sponsored by government 
funding, caused such a public outcry that the right quickly campaigned against welfare 
benefits for refugees.  The campaign, demonstrating the powerful influence of the media, 
was successful.153 By 1999, under the pressure of the mounting political clout of their 
ideological competitor, the DPP, the Social Democrats introduced the first refugee 
integration  law,  the  “Spatial  Dispersal  Policy.” 
 According  to  Olwig,  it  is  the  fear  of  “parallel  societies,”  or  small  ethnic  
communities,  that  spur  the  supposedly  “integrationist”  welfare  policies  of  the  Danish  
government.154 While integration and assimilation may be the tag lines of Danish welfare 
policies towards refugees, the goal tends to favor the development and perpetuation of the 
welfare system, rather than the needs of the displaced families.155 The  “Spatial  Dispersal  
Policy”  is  the  ultimate  example  of  this bias. Birgitte Romme Larsen discusses the policy 
by building off the argument of political scientist, Peter Nannestad. Nannestad theorizes 
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that the social connections from intra-group bonding are what immigrants may need to 
mediate social relations with the society of their greater host country.156 
 Refugees are required to live in local, often extremely small, Danish communities 
for three years. During these years they must take language and culture classes with the 
financial  aid  of  “introduktionsydelse,”  or introductory benefits.157 While the stated 
purpose is geographical distribution to avoid marginalized ghettos, Larsen argues that the 
political  motivation  is  still  obvious:  to  turn  refugees  into  “good  members  of  mainstream  
Danish  society.”158 Choosing a home is  delving  into  the  deepest  aspects  of  people’s  lives.  
It  means  choosing  their  children’s  daycare,  dictating  their  social  networks  and,  most  
contradictory, limiting their employment opportunities.159 These issues were only 
exacerbated in 2001, when Fogh Rasmussen’s  Conservative  Liberal  government  reduced  
the “introduktionsydelse” to  60%  of  ordinary  public  welfare  benefits  to  “motivate  them  to  
work.”160  
 Larsen  interviews  several  refugee  families  who  were  “spatially  dispersed”  
throughout Denmark.  Those who were able to drive to nearby family or similar ethnic 
groups had a much easier time assimilating into Danish society. They were able to learn 
the Danish cultural quirks from groups they trusted which allowed them to later connect 
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with the ethnic Danes in their own towns.161 Larsen discusses in depth the plight of one 
Sudanese refugee family who struggled in a small Danish town without any connections 
to other immigrants of their background. Danish child services were heavily involved in 
their case because the parents did not understand Danish grocery stores and were sending 
their  children  to  school  with  “unhealthy”  lunches.  They  did  not  trust  the  authorities  and  
had  no  ‘mediators’  with  established  roots  of  trust  to  explain  that  the  typical  Danish  bread  
“rugbrod” is expected for lunches. The constant involvement of child services made the 
parents feel undermined and hopeless. Meanwhile, they were increasingly ostracized 
from their local community. They expressed their wishes to leave Denmark once they 
built up the means.162 In other words, their negative experience from spatial dispersal will 
cause them to leave before they have the opportunity to ever give back to the economy of 
the welfare state that has thus far funded them.  
 The importance of a mediating group of the same ethnicity is further evidenced by 
my research at Nyborg Prison. Of the 76 guards interviewed, a startling 100% answered 
that the prisoners divided themselves into groups along ethnic lines. Several other 
categories were mentioned as well, including, but not limited to, religion, age and type of 
crime. However, ethnicity was a group category that was always seen.163 While the prison 
is supposed to be viewed as a microcosm for Danish society, this may be an observation 
closer to the human condition as a whole. It demonstrates the naturalness of forming 
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connections between individuals of a similar ethnicity. These natural connections may 
bring the inmates closer to the wider prison community.   
An ethnic community can serve as a bridge to the culturally homogenous welfare 
state. However, Danish bureaucratic policies serve to isolate rather than assimilate 
refugees  into  Danish  society.  While  the  welfare  policies  for  ‘spatially  dispersed’  refugees  
has undergone influence from right wing populist rhetoric, it is not as intentionally 
Islamophobic  as  the  Danish  state’s  involvement  in  transnational  marriage.   
 
The Danish state on marriage 
 Transnational  marriage  has  been  incorporated  into  the  discussion  of  ‘Danishness,’  
making Denmark the self-proclaimed  ‘hardliner’  on  ethnic  minority  marriages.164 The 
dialogue of the Liberal-Conservative government between 2001 and 2011 can be 
understood  as  “an  experiment  in  subjugating  family  reunification  rights  to  the  greater  
goal of sustaining the welfare state.165”  Despite  being a signatory to the European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  over  60  years  ago,  the  citizen’s  right  to  a  private  family  life  
has been overlooked for the greater interests of the nation.166 In fact, the Migrant Policy 
Index attributes Denmark a low score of 37 out of 100 in regards to family reunification. 
This is particularly startling when compared to its Scandinavian counterparts whose 
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scores range from 68 to 84. Concern for the Danish welfare state has altered the freedom 
of marriage, with a particular effect on Muslim immigrants and their descendants. 
 In his research paper on Pakistani immigrants in Denmark, Garbi Schmidt 
uncovers the individual significance of transnational marriage. In addition to marriage 
serving as an investment in maintaining culture, the Pakistani interviewees argued that 
their marriage choices were part of individual priorities and free will, a staple of Danish 
society.167 However, the mounting laws restricting their freedom to choose a spouse seem 
to be directly aimed at Muslim immigrants. For example, while it is legal to marry ones 
cousin in Denmark, the cousin cannot be from a country other than Denmark.168 Laws 
like  this  stem  from  a  “moral  panic,’  largely  spurred  by  the  Danish  media  and  the  loud  
rhetoric of the right wing populists, to  ‘save’  Muslim  women  from  arranged  marriages  
and abusive relationships.169 The laws are also explained by law makers as modes of post 
9/11  securitization  and  as  part  of  Fogh  Rasmussen’s  integration  plan,  “kulturkamp.”170 
The goal is greater compliance with Danish civic expectations, most notably, that women 
will stand ready to work, pay taxes and participate in Danish institutions.171 The most 
intrusive and interesting law for the purposes of this research is the law of national 
attachment that, according to Schmidt,  has  “established  a  hierarchy  between  citizens  in  
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which,  based  on  an  assumption  of  ‘true’  belonging,  some  have  certain  rights  that  others  
do not.”172 
 The National Attachment law was introduced in 2000 in regards to family 
reunification for foreigners living in Denmark. In 2002 it was applied to Danish citizens 
who married foreigners. Both of the individuals getting married must have a total national 
attachment greater to Denmark than any other country.173 The parameters of national 
attachment change often, but have included parameters like how well they speak Danish, 
how long they have lived in Denmark and whether either partner have any children or 
family members in another country.174 Furthermore, both partners must be over 24, the 
Danish resident should be able to deposit 50,000DK to caution against support payments 
from public welfare and the Danish resident must not have received social support in the 
previous year, a difficult feat in a welfare state.175  These laws had quick and effective 
results. From 2001 to 2009 the percentage of first and second generation immigrants from 
non-western countries that wed people from another country decreased from 61.1% to 
24.9%.176  
 The bias against immigrants from the Middle East is best exemplified by Søren 
Pind, the Minister of Integration in 2010, who suggested in Parliament that people from 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea should be exempt from 
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citizen and national attachment tests.177 Since the election of the new Left wing Social 
Democrat government in 2011, a few of the most restrictive measures of National 
Attachment  have  been  repealed.  However,  “the  paradigm  of  the  competition  welfare  state  
still  stands”  and  spousal  reunification  remains  standing  as  an  issue  of  “Danishness.” 178  
The National Attachment law is still widely supported and the new government does not 
want to isolate voters who have widely shifted to the right on immigration issues.179 
Without being able to choose their own spouse, many immigrants end up moving to 
Sweden to marry, taking with them their economic contributions from the Danish welfare 
system.180 
 
The Danish state on education 
 One of the most important aspects of a welfare state is its educational system. The 
Danish educational system boasts high international rating and progressive policies.181 
While the notion of multiculturalism has been shunned in most sectors of Danish society, 
the Danish education system has recognized the importance of differentiating teaching 
methodology for immigrants who may require some special attention. The Folkeskole 
Act of 1993 set an obligation to differentiate teaching for different types of students, a 
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milestone requirement in a very decentralized system.182 However, the OECD still 
reported unsatisfactory academic performance for Danish bilingual children. In fact, a 
2004 report on OECD progress stated that almost 50% of bilingual children who leave 
Danish primary education are without functional reading skills.183 The Ministry of 
Education has worked quickly to remedy this educational gap with more centralized 
evaluations.  While the Ministry of Education is confident in the educational reforms 
Denmark has made, it acknowledges the issues of implementation in the very 
decentralized Danish education system.184 However, I contend that there may be 
something that goes beyond decentralization that hinders these reforms, most notably, the 
highly politicized nature of Muslim immigrants from right wing populist rhetoric. 
  The majority of bilingual children undergoing Danish education are descendants 
of parents from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia.185  Meaning, the majority of these 
bilingual students who need specialized educational attention are Muslim. In the wake of 
a powerful right wing populist influence, Muslim families are increasingly perceived as a 
hindrance to the Danish school system. For example, Danes often hold the opinion that 
Muslim  parents  “push”  their  children  rather  than  allowing  them  the  freedom to choose 
their own paths, a highly valued component of Danish education.186 In Denmark, all 
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stages of education are paid for by the public sphere and living stipends are offered by the 
government so that every student can follow a path that best suits him or her. 
Furthermore,  ‘play’  is  considered  one  of  the  most  developmentally  important  aspects  of 
childhood.187 In addition to allowing children to play at school, parents are expected to 
allow  their  children  similar  freedoms  at  home.  This  focus  on  ‘play’  and  freedom  can  lead  
to the first of many cultural misunderstandings.  
 Mikkel Rytter explores this  value  clash  in  his  article,  “Money  or  Education?  
Improvement  Strategies  Among  Pakistani  Families  in  Denmark.”  Rytter  studies  the  
immense improvement in the educational achievements of the descendants of Pakistani 
immigrants. Rather than their goals being dictated by a societal pressure for success, 
Pakistani  families  set  their  own  ideals  for  achievement.  These  goals  “from  below”  reflect  
the  family’s  collective  honor  among  their  immigrant  community.188 The prestige of being 
a  taxi driver or a shop owner have diminished and immigrant parents expect their 
children to become doctors, engineers or lawyers. Pakistani parents see their unskilled 
labor  as  a  road  towards  their  children’s  higher  education  making  education  a  “family  
project.”189 This parental pressure clashes with Danish culture and reflects a greater issue 
in Danish education: a lack of communication between the school system and immigrant 
parents. 
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 In Denmark, parents are expected to be highly involved at every level of their 
children’s  education.190 The NGO, Humanity in Action, has explored the disconnect 
between Danish educators and immigrant parents through a series of interviews. These 
interviews revealed that parental pressure is not the only cultural issue that comes into 
play. Danish culture places a lot of emphasis on birthdays, Christmas and most 
controversially, the staple food of pork, a food that is forbidden in Islam. Consequently, 
cultural misunderstandings are rampant in the Danish classroom. The situation is only 
exacerbated by the fact that linguistic barriers often keep immigrant parents ostracized 
from  their  children’s  education.  Parents  also  may  choose  to  be  uninvolved  because  they  
feel unwanted and misunderstood by other parents and teachers.191  
 As a result, a number of immigrant parents have chosen to send their children to 
private schools rather than to public schools that they feel culturally ostracizes them. The 
public school tradition in Denmark runs on a norm of decentralization in which parents 
have nearly complete control over their  children’s  education.192 The probability that a 
student will go to private school increases by age and usually offers some special 
religious or linguistic focus.193 While they are established by the parents, they are mostly 
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funded by tax money or governmental subsidies, making them an affordable option.194 A 
number of municipality changes in 2007 that caused many smaller public schools to shut 
down have directly influenced a spike in private schools throughout Denmark.195 While 
these new schools range in affiliation, it is the small independent Muslim schools that 
have been highly contested in the media.196 The government has responded by altering its 
free school tradition. 
 The DPP has outwardly criticized private Muslim schools for low quality 
education and teachers. However, their critiques clash with a 2006 Ministry of Education 
study that showed 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into 
upper secondary school, against a national average of 26%.197 Nonetheless, the criticism 
of private Muslim schools led to policy changes under the Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government. For example, a school appointed supervisor must be certified by the 
Ministry and master Danish in speech and writing unless at a school with state permission 
to teach another language.198 In 2011, under the left wing Social Democrat government, 
similar policies increased and the supervision of independent schools only intensified.199 
Today,  “centralized  and  decentralized  forms  of  government  are  interwoven  in  a  new  
                                                 
194 Skot and Kofod, 107. 
 
195 Moos, Kofo, Hjort, and Raae, 20. 
 
196 Skot and Kofod, 105. 
 
197 Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Denmark,  “Muslims  in  Denmark,”  Denmark in Lebanon, accessed March 
15, 2014, http://libanon.um.dk/en/about-us/aboutdenmark/muslimsdenmark/. 
 
198 Skot and Kofod, 105. 
 
199 Skot and Kofod, 98. 
 
 65 
 
way”  and  the victims tend to be the small Muslim schools.200 Changes in evaluation 
techniques and increased multi-cultural education in Danish public schools has perhaps 
pacified members of the international community such as OECD, but it has not stopped 
the growing cultural divide between Muslim immigrants and ethnic Danes.  
 Meanwhile, private schools are also on the rise in big cities where parents of 
ethnic Danish origin choose to keep their children separate from immigrant majority 
public schools.201 This  trend  in  ‘free  schools’  has  been  recently  addressed  by  scholar,  
Christer Gerdes. By taking socioeconomic status in to account, he demonstrates that 
pupils in private schools tend to have lower mathematical and written Danish scores than 
those in public schools.202 His research suggests that parents, to some extent, choose to 
send their children to private school for reasons beyond academic promise. While factors 
like religion or perceived educational superiority could come into play, he hypothesizes 
the role of racial and religious prejudices.203 While this is less contested in the media, the 
possibility  of  a  “native  flight”  of  Danes  from  public  education  paints  a  worrying  future  
for Muslim integration. 
 In the conclusion of his study of the education of Pakistani Danes, Rytter predicts 
that as Islamophobia continues to penetrate Danish society, the more educated Pakistani 
Danes will immigrate to Sweden leaving the less educated to subsist largely off the 
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Danish welfare system.204 This prediction can be expanded to the greater population of 
Muslim immigrants. If Muslim immigrants feel that they are unable to give their children 
the education they have worked towards, it is safe to predict a mass emigration of those 
who have built up the means to do so. If the Danish government does not apply reforms 
to public schools more rapidly or address the expansion and selective repression of 
private schools, it may experience a greater welfare drain issue in its future.  
 
The future of the welfare state 
 
 Immigration undoubtedly disrupts the homogenous, small nation that is perceived 
as the ideal home to the welfare state. However, historically, Denmark has publicly 
embraced the effects of globalization in order to serve as an international player. In their 
article  “Small  is  Resilient—the Impact of Globalization on Denmark,” Klaus Nielsen and 
Stefan Kesting state that the Danish government has been able to bring the neo-liberalism 
of the increasingly globalized world into the arms of the welfare state through a 
continuous restructuring of a thoroughly developed state infrastructure and society.205 
Regrettably, they state that the xenophobic attitudes of groups such as the DPP have 
thrown the fate of the welfare state as a whole and that of Denmark as an international 
power into dire question. Nielsen and Kesting lament: 206 
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Overall, the impact of glowing globalization trends on Denmark's  negotiated 
economy seems to resemble a Viking ship in rough sea. To stay the course and 
avoid wreckage one has to rely heavily on a social consensus about the intended 
direction and ensure the collaboration of all crew members through a certain 
degree of solidarity and equality. In the rough sea of globalization, the political 
elite is engaged in efforts to steer the ship, eager to utilize its new opportunities 
while many ordinary citizens are worried about the costs. It remains to be seen 
whether this recent split can be healed or signifies the emergence of persistent 
disruptions in the social consensus. 
 
 
In other words, the DPP hinders the societal transformations Denmark requires to both 
profit from the growth of globalization and maintain the established welfare system. 
 According to the rhetoric of the DPP, immigration reflects the fundamental issue 
with the welfare system; that it steals from the very ethnic Danes who fund it. This 
compelling stance coupled with blatant Islamophobia has allowed the DPP to have a 
profound influence on the type and amount of social services provided to immigrants. 
Refugees have had their stipends cut and their communities dispersed, the right to choose 
a spouse has been drastically restricted, and the Danish education system has been 
unable, and in the case of private school codes, unwilling, to incorporate immigrant 
Muslim students. This uncovers a serious paradox in Danish social services: it works to 
actively push out the very Muslim immigrants who could repay, or even strengthen, the 
welfare state while leaving the poor and needy in the warm embrace of Danish tax 
payers. The Danish welfare state is not evolving with globalization; it is withering under 
the political and social influence of right wing populism.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE REFUGEE AND ASYLUM SYSTEM 
 
From the freest to the strictest 
Denmark is recognized as the first state to ratify the 1951 UNHCR Convention, a 
milestone in refugee and asylum rights. About thirty years later, the Danish Government 
proudly unveiled its 1983 Aliens Act as the most liberal refugee legislature in the world. 
However, in 2002, a new Aliens Act was enacted; this time it was revered as the strictest 
in the world.207 Rapid changes in the political environment brought the Danish asylum 
system from one extreme position to the other.   
In the wake of the destabilizing Arab uprisings, the detrimental aftermath of the 
Iraqi War, and the protracted and bloody Syrian Civil War, Muslim refugees are in 
desperate  need  of  a  safe  haven.  However,  the  routine  defamation  and  ‘otherizing’  of  
Muslims in the Danish media and the fear of immigrant infringement on the welfare state 
during the Liberal-Conservative government culminated in restrictive measures against 
asylum-seekers. These measures range from policies specifically aimed at decreasing the 
number of accepted asylum cases to a decrease in funding for refugee-supporting NGOs. 
I will begin by addressing the adoption of stringent criteria for becoming a Danish 
refugee which has both decreased the number of refugees in Denmark and increased the 
number of refugees waiting in limbo at deportation sites. This will supplement a 
discussion of the lack of advocacy for refugee rights in both the Danish Parliament and in 
Danish civil society. 
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 In the previous chapter, the shortcomings of the Spatial Dispersal policy and the 
welfare benefits of refugees were addressed. This chapter will examine the steps before 
and after the Danish welfare system comes into play: The acceptance or rejection of 
refugees into Denmark as asylum-seekers and the eventual acceptance or rejection of 
those granted asylum as Danish citizens. The increasing strictness, and stunning 
arbitrariness, of these decision making processes reflect a heavy right wing populist 
influence and, by extension, an Islamophobic bias.  
 
An anti-alien Alien Package 
 The  new  “Alien  Package”  of  2002  drastically  changed  the  Danish  asylum  process.    
The controversial bill begins with the following statement which aptly summarizes its 
political  roots  and  motivations:  “The  Government  and  the  Danish  Peoples  Party  agree  
that  the  number  of  aliens  coming  to  denmark  must  be  restricted...”208 The  “Alien  
Package”  was  a  product  of  the  Liberal-Conservative government of former prime 
minister,  Anders  Fogh  Rasmussen,  and  relied  on  the  Danish  People’s  Party  for  a  
Parliamentary majority. The new package completed its goal of decreasing the number of 
aliens, but it was mostly to the detriment of refugees. Before the stringent bill even 
passed,  its  “signal  value”  caused  a  decline  in  asylum  applications,  mostly  from  Iraq  and  
Afghanistan.209 After it was firmly in place, the Danish Immigration Service, the DIS, 
drastically increased their number of asylum rejections, from a 50% rejection rate in 2002 
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to 90% in 2005.210 The decreased amount of asylum-seekers and grantees can be 
attributed to stricter refugee conditions, harsher application procedures and, arguably, 
arbitrary selection choices that reflect the biases of DIS officers.  
  The most influential transformation in the new Alien package on incoming 
refugees  was  the  Danish  government’s  replacement  of  the  “de  facto”  clause  with  its  
weaker  successor,  “status  B.”  The  de  facto  clause  offered  asylum  to  refugees who were 
not clearly covered by the 1951 UNHCR Convention. This included, but was not limited 
to, those fleeing active war service, those without sufficient documentary evidence and 
those fleeing because of a subjective fear of their chaotic home country.211 While  the  “de  
facto”  clause  began  rather  informally  in  the  1960s,  it  was  codified  in  the  previous  1983  
Aliens Act.212 It continued to grow in scope and, eventually, about two thirds of the 
accepted refugees were accepted through the de facto code. This means that only one 
third of asylum grantees were covered by the 1951 Convention.213 However, in 2002 it 
was  replaced  with  “status  B”  which  promises  asylum  to  refugees  who,  in  addition  to  the  
conditions in the 1951 Convention, risk the death penalty, torture or inhumane 
punishment.  While  this  may  seem  fair  on  paper,  these  “extra”  areas  of  coverage  are  
already in the Convention and therefore do not offer asylum-seekers any legal leeway 
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like its legislative predecessor.214 In fact, some even argue that by ignoring  “chaotic”  
situations  and  issues  of  proper  documentary  evidence,  “status  B”  works  in  violation  of  
the European Council of Human Rights.  
 As of 2002, thousands of refugees seeking asylum in Denmark were no longer 
eligible and were either denied entrance  or  feared  deportation.    “Status  B”  had  the  most  
detrimental  effect  on  Somali  aliens  who  were  nearly  all  “de  facto”  refugees.  While  
Somalis feared their chaos in their country, they could not prove that they would be 
subject to inhumane treatment upon their return.215 Some scholars, such as Kim U. Kjær, 
a former researcher at the Danish Institute of Human Rights, have argued that the 
deportation of aliens such as the Somali refugees violates ECHR article 3, the prohibition 
of inhumane punishment or torture.216 He cites Ahmed vs. Austria, a case in which 
Austria was sued for deporting a refugee to a country with chaotic conditions.217 Kjær 
argues that the decrease in the number of refugees, while domestically perceived as a 
national gain, is countered by a loss of respect in the European community. By violating 
article of the EHCR, Danish reforms are led in the opposite direction of those reforms 
suggested by the Council of Europe, a symbolic and political mistake.218 A similar 
political misstep took place nine years later. In 2011, at the end of the Liberal-
Conservative  government’s  administration,  the  DPP  pressed  for  the  reinstatement  of  
border controls. The move was seen internationally as a challenge to the Schengen 
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accord, sending shockwaves through Europe and proving that international political 
agreements  would  not  hinder  the  seriousness  of  the  right  wing’s  animosity  towards  
foreigners.219  
 There  were  several  other  aspects  of  the  “Alien  Package”  that  made  it  undesirable  
to asylum seekers, especially those coming from the Middle East. For example, rather 
than being able to lodge applications at local embassies, asylum seekers must be present 
in Denmark. As a result, difficulty attaining visas often equates to an un-reviewed asylum 
application.220 More importantly, was the decision to limit the number of seats on the 
Refugee Board, those who make the final decision on asylum statuses, from five to three 
seats. The two seats that were cut belonged to the only NGO represented on the board, 
the Danish Refugee Council. Kjær argues that this hurt the legitimacy of the Board by 
abolishing  the  seats  that  could  “act  as  an  independent  guarantor  of  due  process  taking  into  
account  the  requisite  humanitarian  considerations.”221 However, the DRC is not the only 
NGO to rapidly decline in  influence.  Many  NGOs  in  the  early  stages  of  the  “Alien  
Package”  felt  their  government  financial  support  and  advocacy  steadily  waning  while  
others complained of personal DPP attacks.222 For example, the Rehabilitation and 
Research Centre for Torture Victims was forced to give up broader advocacy work and 
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continue  on  a  “paid  per  session”  basis.223 Without civil sector advocacy, refugees are 
more susceptible to systematic discrimination. 
 
Hospitality has its limits 
 The need for more civil sector and human rights involvement in the Danish 
asylum process is of paramount importance when one considers its lacking influence 
prior to the Alien Package. In 2005, Edith Montgomery and Anders Foldspang published 
a disturbing article regarding the predictors of asylum decisions in Denmark. Using data 
from 149 refugee families who entered Denmark in 1992, they concluded that the 
selection process favored refugees who were better socially and culturally situated. Most 
notably,  if  the  family’s  religion  was  another  than  Islam, it was positively associated with 
a residence permit. Therefore, their findings demonstrate a diminishing role of human 
rights violations in asylum decisions even before the 2002 crack-down.224 Without the 
Danish Refugee Council and other NGOs advocating against discrimination in asylum 
decisions, one should fear for the future of Muslim asylum seekers in Denmark.  
 The discrimination against Muslim refugees became clear under Birthe Rønn 
Hornbech, The Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs from 2007 to 
2011. Despite being a loyal member of the right-wing Liberal Party, her statements often 
took members of parliament by surprise.  Against the will of her own party, she 
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disapproved of headscarf bans.225 However, her hospitality did not extend to Muslim 
refugees. In 2009, to the shock of the international community and after an agreement to 
offer asylum to a certain number of Iraqi quota refugees, Rønn Hornbech rescinded her 
Iraqi quota and replaced it with Burmese refugees. A clear reason was not given to 
explain  the  decision  other  than  the  Danish  government  had  “very  good  experience  in  
integrating  Burmese”226 However, the fact that a less controversial Buddhist group 
replaced the more media-centric Muslim refugees should not be overlooked. While this 
example  only  hints  at  Rønn  Hornbech’s  discriminatory  bias,  the  events  of  March  2011  
more strongly it. Evidence eventually surfaced about the failure to grant Danish 
citizenship to stateless Palestinians born in Denmark, a blatant violation of international 
law.227 Rønn Hornbech was quickly dismissed, but the discrimination has not been 
forgotten among the Palestinian Danish population as several Palestinians are still 
demanding financial compensation.228 
 The limitations of Danish hospitality is further explained  in  Ulrik  Pram  Gad’s  
paper  for  the  Norwegian  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  “Conditions for Hospitality or 
Defense of Identity?: Writers in need of Refuge- A Case of Denmark's 'Muslim 
relations.’”  In  it,  he  discusses  the  discriminatory  language in the 2008 bill passed in 
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Parliament  to  include  Denmark  in  the  “International  Cities  of  Refuge”  network  for  
writers escaping persecution. The fleeing writers are not granted asylum rights in 
Denmark  like  in  many  other  “Cities  of  Refuge”  locations.229  Instead, the writers must 
sign  a  “Declaration  of  recognition  of  the  fundamental  values  of  Danish  Society”  and  
agree to leave the country within two years. In the words of Pam Gad, their stay is 
“conditional”  and  the  declaration  is  basically  a  “caricature  catalogue of the vices of 
Muslims, as they appear in Danish debates on integration.230”  The  writers,  who  are  
carefully not described as refugees in Danish debate and legislature, must agree to give 
up the cultural traits the Danish government identifies them with. This list of imposed 
traits includes undermining democracy, oppressing or disrespecting women and children, 
and supporting acts of terrorism.231 By  using  the  “Cities  of  Refuge”  bill  as  an  example,  
Pram  Gad  concludes  that  the  Danish  government  follows  a  “Making us good by listing 
their  vices”  approach  in  its  legislature  in  order  to  not  “compromise  the  homogeneity  of  
Denmark.232”  In  other  words,  hospitality  for  refugees  seems  to  have  its  limits  when  
Muslims are concerned.  
 
The woes of permanent residence 
 If granted asylum, the residence of the refugee is expected to be temporary. The 
eventual repatriation and reintegration of the refugees to their home country is naturally 
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the preferred solution. Accordingly, the Danish Act of Repatriation offers a 12 month 
leeway for repatriated refugees to return to Denmark. Unfortunately, this focus on 
repatriation   can   lead   to   “circular   repatriation,”   the   unsuccessful   reintegration   of  
repatriated refugees who then return to Denmark.233 A 2008 UNHCR study analyzes the 
circular repatriation of Iraqis with refugee status in Denmark. Of 306 repatriated Iraqis, 
76 returned to Denmark within their allotted time. The reasons for their return ranged 
from indirect economic pressure to leave Denmark to direct pressure from their 
individual caseworkers. In almost all cases, their desire to leave Denmark was greater 
than their desire to return home.234 Repatriation rather than integration seems to take the 
forefront for those with Danish refugee status. However, many refugees do not want to 
live in Denmark, but cannot return home. This does not bode well for their eventual 
return to Danish society.  
 Despite the pressure to repatriate, those still vying for permanent residence in 
Denmark may rely on their mental illness. Specific mental health problems can lead to a 
humanitarian residence permit. However, a humanitarian residence permit will only last 
two years before the refugee needs to reapply, with the same basis as before.235 In other 
words, if the refugee wants to stay in Denmark, he or she must still be mentally ill. In 
their article regarding the rights of children in this asylum system, Kathrine Vitus and 
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Hilde   Liden   argue   that   this   route   towards   humanitarian   residence   is   “paradoxical”  
because   it   possibly   “encourages   a   deterioration   in   the asylum-seekers’   mental   and  
physical health as a way of receiving asylum.236”  Nonetheless,  it  is  one  of  the  very  few  
routes available towards a residence permit.  
 In the rare cases a permanent residence permit is given, the route to citizenship 
has been personally attacked during the Liberal-Conservative government. As of 2007, 
the citizenship test was directly from the textbook Danmark Før og Nu, Denmark Past 
and Present, which was taught in Danish language schools to prepare residents for the 
test.237 However, with pressure from the DPP, the test was suddenly changed in 
September 2008 and the new guidelines were not posted until November. The change 
seemed like a direct attack on applicants who had registered relying on the old 
conditions. Headmasters of language schools tried to fight the rapid change, but their 
struggle was to no avail.238 The pass rate dropped suddenly from 97% to 23.5% in 
December 2008.239 The unexpected change and stark decline in pass rates supports the 
theory that it was an attack on the extension of Danish citizenships. After the guidelines 
had been posted for a longer time and students had a fair amount of study time, the pass 
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rate plateaued at 42.1% in June 2009.240 Nonetheless, the questions of the new test faced 
serious criticisms 
 Seven questions on this new citizenship test were questioned as imprecise, while 
one was quickly proven blatantly incorrect. Difficult questions like, what was the Danish 
population in the Viking era, were nearly unanswerable by Danish citizens themselves.241 
A 2010 study at a Danish High School showed that 2 out of 3 high school level social 
studies students were unable to pass the test.242 Similarly, but more shockingly, another 
study around the same time revealed that, despite 84% of DPP members approving of the 
strict text, only every third member could pass it.243 The goal of this test was not to make 
Danish citizens; the test was a ploy to prevent the growth in number of Danish citizens.  
 
The forgotten: camps and children 
 In my prison research, the most depressing section to visit was the deportation 
floor.244  The silence on this floor in comparison to the rest of the prison could have 
several explanations: they were depressed about facing deportation because of their 
crime, they lacked human contact because of language barriers, or they were just 
completely isolated from the rest of the prison community. Nonetheless, with only a few 
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inmates occupying the section, the floor seemed oddly void of conversation or activity. 
Even among the wider prison community, those who feared deportation in the future 
were clearly taking steps that distanced themselves from the other inmates and, by 
extension, the wider Danish community. For example, a few potential deportees 
explained that they chose English language classes over Danish classes because if they 
were deported the Danish language is futile; a valid point that unfortunately and 
inadvertently undermines attempts at Prison integration. Issues of loneliness, isolation 
and integration are representative of issues among refugees facing the constant threat of 
deportation in Danish asylum camps. 
 Those  refugees  known  as  “phase  3  rejected  asylum  seekers”  are  faced  with  time,  
ranging from a few days to dozens of years, at an asylum camp.245 These refugees are 
either held up by administrative and bureaucratic processes or are refusing to return to 
their home country. Most of these refugees come from Iraq, Iran and Somalia, countries 
that Denmark has no treaty allowing for the forced return of asylum-seekers.246 The 
largest and most controversial camp is in Sandholm, a Suburb of Copenhagen. Many 
journalists  have  travelled  to  Sandholm  to  comment  on  its  overarching  depressive  “feeling  
of   uncertainty.”247 While the conditions are not bad, one of the denied asylum seekers 
compares her temporary  home  of  12  years  to  “a  grave”  because  she  “feel[s]  like  a  dead  
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person in it- with no future, nothing.248”   Meanwhile,   no   changes   have   been   made   to  
account for these long, possibly indefinite, stays.  
 A 2008 BBC article discusses how Sandholm and its Danish counterparts are only 
built to last people one or two years, despite its long term occupants. Most notably, how 
education cannot develop with the asylum-seekers rendering their education and skills 
virtually useless. In the article, Mads Carstensen, former head of training at the Danish 
Red   Cross,   laments   “You   spend   all   this   time   in   the   Danish   asylum   system   without  
working, without using your skills, and eventually you become passive. You lose your 
ability to act for yourself."249 This forced passivity does not help alleviate the mental 
problems of those already in the camp. A 2007 study by Amnesty International of 142 
people at Sandholm Camp, most of whom were from Iraq, Iran or Syria, revealed that 
65% fulfilled the symptom criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Amnesty 
International concluded its report by stating that this vulnerable group required attention 
and aid that they were not receiving.250 
  Scholars have also begun to question the legality of this forced passivity in 
regards to its compliance with   the  Children’s  Rights  Convention.  The   vast  majority   of  
children   attend   asylum   schools   for   “reception   level”   classes   that   have   fewer   hours   and  
subjects than the public school system. Additionally, with a deficient number of 
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multilingual teachers, the asylum schools find themselves out of compliance with the 
CRC’s  right  to  equal  opportunity  and  education.251  Other criticisms of CRC compliance 
include   a   random  process   of   selection   that   ignore   the   child’s   health   and,   by   extension,  
denying them the rights of   “individual   personality”   or   a   “place   in   the   decision  making  
process.”252However, the CRC, like other aforementioned international conventions, 
finds itself outside of Danish legal and public discourse.253 If the residents of the camps, 
including the children, are ever able to enter Danish society, they will be unable to 
contribute. Until then, they wait.  
 Even though Sandholm refugees have no education or job opportunities available 
to   them  outside   the  camp’s  gates,   they  are   typically  allowed   to   leave  and   return freely. 
However, this freedom was restricted by the most notable piece of legislation to reach the 
camps   in   years,   the   2008   “Law   69.”   After   three   Tunisian   Muslim   asylum-seekers in 
Sandholm were suspected of plotting an attack on cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard, the 
illustrator  of  the  infamous  “Muhammad  bomb-turban”  cartoon,  they  were  forced  to  check  
in with authorities every day. In December 2008, under pressure from the DPP, this 
precaution   was   extended   to   every   refugee   in   Sandholm.   Law   69,   nicknamed   “the 
Tunisian   law,”   only   affects Sandholm camp refugees. Rønn Hornbech introduced this 
“Special   law,”   meaning   an   unusually   specific   and   quickly   implemented   law   generally  
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effected by public opinion, which was then supported by the DPP.254 It has since been 
called a waste of resources for adding to the bureaucracy of camp procedures, illegal for 
changing the contract of those already in the camp, and Islamophobic for its roots in the 
Cartoon Crisis.255256   
 
The future of the refugee and asylum system 
 The Danish refugee and asylum system as it stands presents two serious problems 
that stem from the right wing populist influence during the Liberal-Conservative 
coalition. Firstly, it is being questioned by scholars for its compliance with international 
and European code. While the reinstatement of border controls that challenged the 
Schengen accord have since been rescinded by the current Social-Democrat government, 
most of the internationally questionable refugee legislation remains intact. Most notably, 
the replacement of  the  asylum  “de  Facto”  clause  with  “status  B,”  which  moves  in  the  
opposite direction of reforms encouraged by the European Council of Human Rights. 
Furthermore, the CRC remains unaddressed in Danish refugee discourse. Secondly, the 
pressure for repatriation, difficulty in gaining asylum and the mentally trying and 
isolationist life in Danish refugee camps mostly likely hinders refugee integration into 
and appreciation of Danish society. What remains is a system that is increasingly 
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detached from international legislation and a refugee population, mostly Muslim, who 
feel increasingly unwelcome in what they see as a hostile and discriminatory country.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Right wing populism in Denmark 
 The election of 2001 brought a Liberal-Conservative coalition into power. They 
would remain in a place of political supremacy for ten years. This assent of the right-
wing in Danish politics relied on the continued support of the DPP, the first powerful 
Nordic right wing populist party. The Danish electorate is attracted to the nationalist 
platform that the DPP claims ownership of. However, the electorate understanding of 
nationalism  hinges  on  the  protection  of  the  “Danish  way  of  life”  from  a  perceived  threat,  
in this case, a Muslim population with conflicting values. An Islamophobic right wing 
populist discourse has since colored Danish political debate.  
  The political and social environments in Denmark since 2001 have worked to 
hinder rather than bolster successful integration of Muslim immigrants. A significant 
portion of the Danish media, arguably influenced and supported by the government, 
functions  under  an  “us-vs.  them”  paradigm  framed  by  the  extreme  right  in  Danish  
politics. Furthermore, a welfare system has emerged that withholds rights from 
immigrants  who  must  first  prove  their  “Danishness,”  an  arbitrary  term  defined  by  right  
wing populist rhetoric. Cultural misunderstandings have culminated in an outward 
movement of both Muslim and ethnic Danes from the Danish public school system and 
the growth of private schools that are divided along religious lines. Lastly, the strict 
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refugee and asylum system functions to further isolate Muslims from Danish culture. The 
rise of right wing populist power has made Denmark a country where Muslim immigrants 
feel increasingly unwelcome. 
 The explosion of right wing populist policy and rhetoric in Denmark that seems to 
specifically ostracize Muslim immigrants and their descendants could have profound 
consequences both domestically and internationally. Firstly, media crises, like the 
“Cartoon  Crisis”  of  2005,  endanger both Danes and foreigners. While it seems that the 
Danish government is better equipped to respond to such crises in the future, there still 
needs to be a shift in media dialogue. Muslims need to  become  part  of  “Danishness”  as  it  
is portrayed by the media not to undermine governmental attempts at integration. 
Secondly, if Muslims feel generally ostracized or limited by Danish social services, they 
may emigrate out of Denmark. These emigrants will be those successful enough to afford 
passage and they will leave before they have an opportunity to repay the welfare system 
that had thus far funded them. Thirdly, by pushing refugees away, sometimes keeping 
them isolated in camps, Danish asylum policies can further hinder the future integration 
of its refugees who may end up resenting and, therefore, not contributing to the country 
that begrudgingly took them in. This can also lead to detrimental isolation from the 
international arena. If the Danish media, social services and refugee and asylum system 
continue to be heavily influenced by right wing populism, I predict that Danish policies 
will also contribute to the spread of vitriolic rhetoric throughout Europe. In other words, 
the  legitimacy  of  a  “liberal”  state  behaving  illiberally  is  a  potentially  dangerous  
phenomenon.  
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 I will now offer suggestions for further study and commentary on the future of the 
Danish state in relationship to Muslim immigrants. This will be done through an analysis 
of the current political climate and a critique of the modern understanding of integration 
into  Denmark,  into  the  “Danish  way  of  life.”  However,  before  embarking  on  these  
thoughts, it is important to pay homage to the legitimate arguments of the DPP.  
 
The allure of the far right 
 Before the DPP gained parliamentary power, there was a prevailing sense of 
uncertainty regarding the future of Denmark, that is, the future of the small welfare state 
in the wake of ever increasing globalization. This fear of the social and economic future 
spanned across the Danish political spectrum. Danes from a variety of political parties 
turned to the DPP because it seemed like the only party to offer clear solutions. In fact, in 
2001, 25% of DPP voters used to vote for the left-wing Social Democratic Party and 10 
to 12% of DPP voters were supporters of the far left Socialist People's Party.257  If Danish 
society was to become multi-ethnic, the Danish citizens wanted to know under which 
conditions and at what speed.258 The DPP had an answer: slow the stream of migration to 
a trickle and integrate those immigrants into Danish culture and society. Furthermore, the 
DPP  eschewed  the  ‘political  correctness’  that  many  voters  had  long  felt  was  limiting  
necessary political discourse. In the words of political scientist, Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 
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the  DPP  “initiated  a  veritable  crusade  against  elitist  `opinion-makers.'”259 The DPP 
offered Danes a populist understanding of the future of their country; an undeniably 
alluring concept.  
My research has not been a scholarly attempt to bring Denmark closer to a 
multiculturalist agenda; a system in which every culture is allowed to function separately 
and outside of the confines of a Danish communal identity.  In fact, Anders Per Rudling 
summarizes my sentiments best when stating, “No  society  is  so  void  of  values  that  it  can  
provide  that  “neutral”  cultural  framework  which  multiculturalists  so  desire.  The  process  
of  constructing  this  “neutral”  society  – itself an oxymoron - necessarily includes the 
retreat from liberal democratic values.260”  The Danes are a small citizenry with a deeply-
rooted heritage. The importance placed on a united community in Danish society would 
make the very establishment of a multicultural state an infringement on their democracy. 
Their language,  culture,  and  that  illusive  and  undefinable,  “Danish  way  of  life”  will  
continue to pulse through the streets of Copenhagen and the rolling hills of Northern 
Jutland.  I truly understand the emotional significance of clinging to the Danish identity.  
It is a culture I grew up with and hold very dear. Nonetheless, I have serious trepidations 
about the DPP and their influence on several sectors of Danish society. The systematic 
construction  of  an  “other”  through  a  right  wing  populist  agenda  is  an  unacceptable means 
of sustaining a culture that, in reality, is under no impending threat. 
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Same game, new playing field 
 
  Unfortunately, there is a serious gap in data from the last few years of the 
Liberal-Conservative coalition to today. Since the shock of the “Cartoon Crisis”  has  worn  
off, data regarding how Muslims are portrayed in the Danish media or how they are 
treated in the Danish asylum system are virtually not existent. This is a grave mistake. 
Denmark’s  small  size  should  not  deter  from  academic  research. It is important to analyze 
the continuing evolution of the treatment of immigrants to uncover the influence of right 
wing populist parties in Europe. Furthermore, continued research is important on the 
domestic front as it seems that the future of Denmark will include a strong right wing 
populist voice. 
 With the victory of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and her party, the 
Social Democrats, the premiership of the Liberal-Conservative coalition came to an end 
in late 2011 and, by extension, the direct influence of the DPP began to whither. As 
stated earlier, the citizenship test is now passable and border controls repealed. However, 
other than these two alterations, the Social-Democrats have changed few of the 
Islamophobic policies of their predecessors. Nonetheless, Thorning-Schmidt is 
increasingly unpopular among the Danish electorate. Her politics are increasingly 
unpopular and internal criticism from her own party is rampant.261 Political experts are 
predicting that she will either resign in the immediate future to take a position among the 
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EU or that she will simply lose the next election.262 It seems increasingly likely that the 
vacuum left by her retirement or loss of support will be filled by parties that have 
internalized the extreme rhetoric the DPP.  
 It is very plausible that the Liberal Party, with the voter support of the DPP, will 
win the next election, bringing the DPP back to its 2001-2011 level of political 
traction.263 I suggest that Danish citizens recognize the role of right wing populism in the 
failures of integrationist policies when casting their ballots. If the DPP increases its 
influence in Parliament, and more importantly, its influence over the Danish electorate, I 
hope  they  can  expand  their  limited  understanding  of  “Danishness”  to include Muslim 
immigrants. Otherwise, I predict integrationist policies will continue to ostracize rather 
than integrate Muslims and that Denmark may become a breeding ground for extremist 
rhetoric, ostracizing itself from the globalized European community. 
 
 
Exploring  “Danishness” 
 
Integration  does  not  mean  expunging  the  heritage  of  one’s  descendants  or  
shunning  one’s  religion  in  order  gain  the  respect  of  fellow  citizens.  In  her  work,  
“Transnationalism  and  Ethnonational  Diasporism,”  Gabriel  Sheffer  defines integration as 
“various  degrees  of....learning  to  operate  socially,  politically,  and  economically  within  
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the host land while maintaining cultural separation.264”  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  to  be  
Danish, function in Danish society, and celebrate Ramadan. Nonetheless, I recognize that 
if Muslims function on the fringes of society, living off Danish welfare and shutting off 
their wider community, they will continue to be defined outside the realm of what is 
Danish. Integration is crucial, but it needs to be done separately from right wing populist 
rhetoric. Integration is a dual process that involves mutual understanding and respect. It 
requires an acceptance of a level of hybridity among identities. The right wing populist 
policies and rhetoric beginning in 2001 have slowly worked to break this dual process on 
both  sides:  It  places  Muslims  in  a  category  wholly  different  from  “Danishness”  in  the  
eyes of ethnically Danish citizens and it builds up resentment of the Danish state in the 
eyes of Muslim immigrants and their descendants.  
Any  Dane  can  easily  discern  the  imposed  attributes  of  the  Muslim  ‘other’  in  
public Danish discourse. If a Muslim beats his children, he is a Muslim, not a Dane. If a 
Muslim woman wears a hijab she is a victim of the Islamic patriarchy, not a Dane. If a 
Muslim  has  qualms  with  notions  widely  considered  “liberal,”  he  is  an  example  of  the  
anti-democratic Muslim state, not a Dane. Most notably, if a Muslim openly practices his 
religion, he is a zealot, not a Dane. The list can go on, but  the  point  is  that  “Danishness”  
is  defined  by  what  “Danishness”  is  not.  However,  ethnically  Danish  citizens  who  commit  
a crime or have conservative beliefs are still considered Danish by the wider public.  
Therefore,  it  seems  that  “Danishness,”  as  it  is  described by the prevailing right wing 
populist rhetoric, has one main criterion: to not be Muslim. This hypocrisy in a country 
that champions liberal ideals is what his paper has tried to unveil. 
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APPENDIX A: ABRIDGED OBSERVATIONS 
“The  Danish  Prison  Experience”  Research  Project  at  Nyborg  Fængsel from June 2012 
through July 2012. 
(Only observations considered prevalent to this paper have been included.) 
 
Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
Guard 
House 
Guards stress on 
numerous occasions that 
they always try to 
remain calm, treat 
inmates  “like  humans”  
(no matter their crime) 
and that they do not 
believe in using force 
unless absolutely 
necessary (a life is on 
the line). 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
What  does  “like  
humans”  really  
mean? It is 
possible that the 
guards are just 
telling me what 
they think I, an 
outsider, would 
like to hear. 
However, 
considering I 
never witnessed 
force from a guard 
I assume the 
violence part is 
true. 
Middle 
Section 
I often shake hands with 
prisoners and introduce 
myself. 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
It is possible that 
prisoners were 
trying to impress 
me, the outsider. 
However, the 
behavior seemed 
normal. 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
Middle 
Section 
I am taught that the 
Prison’s  “Middle  
Section”  houses  the  
“typical  inmate”  (about  
20 in each section). 
Each inmate pays for his 
own TV, food, does his 
own  cooking…It  
reminds me of a little 
village. 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
Perhaps only 
those  “typical  
inmates”  (those  
who do not 
require isolation) 
are the only ones 
that the 
microcosm theory 
applies to. 
Middle 
Section 
Some prisoners were 
not given work because 
there was not enough 
work to go around. In 
this case, they received 
unemployment money. 
If they do work they can 
make an average of 500 
kroner (about $93) per 
week. 
This can both serve both 
as evidence for and 
against the argument 
that the Prison works as 
a microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
Does the 
unemployment in 
the prison 
compare to the 
unemployment 
level in Danish 
society?  
Several 
Prison 
wings 
“Weak”  prisoners  are  
kept separate for their 
own protection. This 
includes ex-gang 
members, sexual 
offenders, those who are 
“easily  influenced,”  and  
drug addicts. 
These  “weak”  inmates  
should not be included 
in a microcosm 
approach 
Does the 
exclusion of these 
“weak”  inmates  
from  the  “Middle  
section”  delineate 
from  the  “typical”  
inmates 
“normalization”  
process.  
Hospital 
wing 
There is a dentist and 
physical therapist which 
inmates can pay for. 
They seem to be 
regularly used.     
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
I would like to 
know the statistics 
on who can afford 
such treatment. 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
On-site 
Church 
Church can convert into 
any other religious 
establishment, but there 
is only a priest on staff. 
Apparently, they 
discontinued the use of 
Imams because they 
“riled  up”  the  Muslim  
inmates who are 
“usually  not  religious.”  
This happened during 
the Muhammad Cartoon 
Crisis of 2005, but no 
other information is 
offered by Prison 
Guard.  
This can symbolize the 
“blame  the  imam”  
approach followed 
during  the  “Cartoon 
Crisis.”  This  is  a  very  
important observation. 
Why has another 
imam not been 
hired (is there 
really not a single 
Imam in Denmark 
that  does  not  “rile  
up”  inmates)?  Are  
Muslim inmates 
upset about this? 
Muslim 
prayer 
room 
Very nice room. 
However, it is never 
used by inmates. Sense 
of abandonment. 
Perhaps Muslim inmates 
are not inspired to pray 
without an Imam 
present in their lives. 
This interpretation 
insinuates that the 
Prison is hindering the 
public demonstrations 
of Islam. Another 
interpretation is that 
Muslim inmates are 
really not religious. 
Finally, it can be 
interpreted that the 
inmates maybe feel 
uncomfortable about 
Islam and do not attend 
the prayer room in an 
attempt  to  “fit  in.”  All  
of these interpretations 
have obvious societal 
implications. 
What would 
happen if one 
Muslim inmate 
started going to 
the prayer room? 
Would a barrier of 
fear be broken and 
would others 
attend to. Would 
there be a demand 
for a new Imam? 
Would he be 
ostracized by the 
wider prison 
community, 
including other 
Muslim inmates 
or would nobody 
care?  
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
On-site 
School 
School is a choice for 
everyone  in  the  “middle  
section”  and  they  get  
paid for attending. 
English is the most 
commonly requested 
class (much greater than 
Danish). After asking an 
inmate of Middle 
Eastern descent the 
response I got was: 
many of the prisoners 
are going to be deported 
following their sentence 
so learning Danish 
would be futile. 
However, most inmates 
are just already fluent in 
Danish. 
Another example of the 
“Middle  section”  being  
an example of wider 
Danish society. The 
commonality of English 
over Danish classes is 
an important 
observation. It 
demonstrates that the 
fear of deportation 
stemming from harsh 
immigration and asylum 
laws can hinder 
integration into Danish 
society. 
Of those that 
choose English 
over Danish 
because of a 
specific fear of 
deportation, how 
many are actually 
deported? Being a 
White, American 
observer the 
inmate may have 
just been telling 
me what he 
thought would 
sound interesting.  
Workshops Various types of 
workshops available. 
Some of these trades 
offer certificates of 
completion which can 
be used to find 
employment following 
release. 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
Do most inmates 
utilize these 
certificates upon 
release?  
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
Workshops I am taken aback by a 
statement from the 
workshop teacher who 
states that the Polish 
have an aptitude for 
making shoes and 
Africans have an 
aptitude for welding. 
This blatant racist 
stereotype is said very 
nonchalantly and caused 
no response from 
surrounding inmates. 
These stereotypical 
views are common-
placed, perhaps 
representing beliefs in 
wider society 
Perhaps this 
teacher was an 
anomaly. 
Workshops An issue that I notice 
with job training is that 
the manuals are often in 
only Danish or English 
which not all the 
prisoners understand, 
but teachers work hard 
to accommodate. 
This could represent 
issues in the Danish 
schooling system in 
wider society.  
Are these inmates 
who have Danish 
as a second or 
third language 
learning Danish in 
the language 
schools? If not, 
why? 
Middle 
Section 
Often the line between 
prison guards, teachers, 
and inmates is not 
clearly defined because 
many are so friendly 
together  I  often  couldn’t  
tell who is who. 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
Perhaps 
relationships are 
accentuated for 
me, the outsider. 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
Middle 
Section 
Many things have 
changed because a lack 
of funds; for example, 
they were moving out 
all the billiards tables 
because they were too 
expensive to keep up. 
Also there is a huge area 
outside of the prison 
that used to be a giant 
garden for inmates to 
work  at,  but  it  wasn’t  
affordable. 
This can both serve both 
as evidence for and 
against the argument 
that the Prison works as 
a microcosm for the 
society it is in. Perhaps 
budget issues hinder the 
“normalization”  process  
or maybe it reflects 
economic issues in 
wider society. 
How do budget 
cuts in the prison 
compare to cuts in 
other parts of 
Danish society? 
Middle 
Section 
All men under 18 must 
go to school or training. 
They are well aware of 
their educational and 
professional 
opportunities because of 
the  “Skadhauge  plan”  
(an informational packet 
they are given upon 
arrival.) 
This serves as evidence 
for the argument that the 
Prison works as a 
microcosm for the 
society it is in.  
Do those with 
lacking Danish or 
English skills 
properly 
understand all 
their professional 
and educational 
opportunities? 
Guard 
House 
There is a conference at 
the prison trying to 
recruit more workers of 
different ethnicities. 
Representative of 
changes in society 
trying to incorporate a 
more ethnically diverse 
workforce. 
How many of 
Middle Eastern 
descent were 
actually hired? 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
Deportation 
Section 
There are two inmates 
in separate cells far 
away from each other. 
The guard comments it 
is a very boring floor 
because there are few 
guards on duty and the 
inmates rarely speak 
Danish or English. He 
also says, if they do 
speak English or Danish 
they are too sad or 
angry to communicate 
with guards. They are 
not offered the same 
education/work 
opportunities. I leave 
floor feeling very 
depressed.  One inmate 
looks as though he had 
been crying. Neither 
speaks to me.  
Very important 
observation for the 
demoralization of 
deportation. Could 
represent Danish asylum 
camps. 
Do any of these 
inmates try to 
return to 
Denmark? I did 
not spend a lot of 
time in this 
section so my 
observation could 
have been an 
anomaly. 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
On-site 
drug 
treatment 
center 
There are two out of 12 
openly Muslim inmates. 
Both are of Middle 
Eastern descent. One 
from Iraq, the other 
does not tell me his 
country of origin. Both 
seem well liked by other 
inmates.  
There are two possible 
interpretations. Firstly, 
perhaps Muslim inmates 
fit in with no problems 
in Danish prison 
society. Or, perhaps in 
the  “safe”  environment  
of the treatment center, 
solidarity in recovery 
overcomes other ethnic 
and religious tensions. 
On average, what 
is the 
representation of 
Muslims in the 
drug treatment 
center compared 
to the 
representation of 
Muslims in the 
prison as a whole? 
Were the Muslim 
inmates friends 
with the other 
men before 
coming to the 
treatment center? 
Will they remain 
close after? 
On-site 
drug 
treatment 
center 
The Iraqi in the Drug 
treatment center gets 
excited about the fact 
that I know a little 
Arabic. He tries to teach 
me Arabic over a few 
meals. (I am eating 
meals with inmates in 
the Drug treatment 
center) 
He is proud and 
unashamed of their 
Middle Eastern and 
Muslim culture. 
Is this only a 
representation of 
behavior in the 
“safe”  
environment of 
the treatment 
center? 
On-site 
drug 
treatment 
center 
Waiting lists for 
treatment centers 
because they are very 
desired but also very 
hard to qualify for. 
Everyone eats together 
(staff included) at 
treatment centers. 
Lines are further blurred 
between inmates and 
guards which can be 
used as evidence for the 
argument that the Prison 
works as a microcosm 
for the society it is in. 
However, its exclusivity 
also hinders this theory.  
Once again, I 
wonder, on 
average, what is 
the representation 
of Muslims in the 
drug treatment 
center compared 
to the 
representation of 
Muslims in the 
prison as a whole? 
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Location Observation Interpretation Ethical Issues/ 
Further 
Questions 
On-site 
drug 
treatment 
center 
Other Muslim inmate 
gets caught with drugs 
and is kicked out of 
center. Some men cry at 
his departure. The Iraqi 
inmate refuses to 
believe his friend  is 
guilty and tells me it is a 
conspiracy among the 
guards. 
Further demonstrates 
friendship and solidarity 
between all inmates in 
drug recovery, no matter 
their ethnicity or 
religion. However, the 
“conspiracy  theory”  of  
the other Muslim inmate 
could reflect a distrust 
of Danish authority. 
Once again, I 
wonder, were the 
Muslim inmates 
friends with the 
other men before 
coming to the 
treatment center? 
Will they remain 
close after? 
On-site 
drug 
treatment 
center 
The inmates are very 
upset to learn they 
cannot go to the store 
the day of my birthday 
because they wanted to 
bake me a cake. 
Demonstrates that I 
have  begun  to  “fit  in”  
and my presence is not 
perceived as unnatural. 
Am I honored 
with the same 
trust and respect 
as a guard, 
another inmate or 
none of the 
above? 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY AND RESPONSES 
 
 
Survey sent out to employees in the Danish Prison Service (English Translation by 
author)  
 
1. Gender? 
Male 
Female 
 
2. How long have you worked in the Danish Prison Service? 
1 year 
2 years 
3 years 
4 years 
5 years 
6 years 
7 years 
8 years 
9 years 
10 years 
11 years 
12 years 
13 years 
14 years 
15 years 
16 years 
17 years 
18 years 
19 years 
20 years or more 
 
3.  How often do you socialize with colleagues outside of the workplace? 
    Often 
     I have many friends from work and we socialize outside of the workplace. 
    Sometimes 
     I sometimes meet with colleagues outside of the workplace. 
    Never 
     I have no friends from work and I do not socialize with colleagues outside of the workplace. 
 
4.  How did you become interested in the Prison Service? 
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5. Describe your job position? 
 
 
 
 
6. Have  you  noticed  a  trend  of  “cliques”  among  the  prisoners?  (A  group  that  stays  
together and excludes others) 
    Yes 
     Inmates ALWAYS form groups 
    Sometimes 
     Inmates OCASSIONALLY form groups 
    Never 
     Inmates NEVER form groups. 
 
7. When prisoners form cliques/groups, what do you think is the basis for their 
formation?  
You may well highlight more of the following answers.  
(If you answered "No" to Question 6 please jump to question 8)  
    Ethnicity 
     Inmates of common ethnic background come together to form a group 
    Crime 
     Inmates who committed the same type of crime come together to form a group 
    Age 
     Inmates of a similar same age group come together to form a group 
    Religion 
     Inmates of the same religious background come together to form a group 
    Coincidence 
     Inmates form groups without seeming to have anything in common 
    Other 
 
 
 
 
8. After the controversial publishing of Muhammad cartoons in Jyllands-Posten in 2005, 
did you notice a change in behavior among inmates from the Middle East?  
     I was not working within the prison system at the time.  
     I did not notice any change in behavior.  
     If you noticed a change in behavior, please describe what you observed: 
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9. Do you observe that current events in the news affect the behavior of inmates?  
    Yes 
     I OFTEN see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates 
    Sometimes 
     I SOMETIMES see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates 
    Never 
     I NEVER see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates 
 
10. In the time you have worked in the prison system, have you witnessed fights over 
ethnic or religious disagreements?  
      I have NEVER seen fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements.  
      I have a SINGLE fight among inmates over ethnic or religious disagreements.  
      I have seen SEVERAL fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements. 
      I OFTEN see fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements. 
 
 
